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Executive Summary
 Today, approximately 23 million migrant  children live in China’s cities. However, 
China’s anachronistic household registration system (hukou system) prevents migrant workers 
and their children from accessing public benefits like public education. In response, private 
entrepreneurs began opening private, illegal schools for migrant children in cities like Beijing 
and Shanghai in the early  1990s. In January 2014, the Beijing government began implementation 
of the “Five Certificate Policy,” which provides a pathway for migrant students to obtain a public 
school enrollment number but only after they have secured a set of five “certificates,” or items of 
paperwork, to qualify. 
  In this study, I interviewed migrants and researchers to determine the greatest challenges 
presently faced by migrant schools and how those challenges are translated to their students in 
Beijing. I also interviewed migrant parents and teaches on the consequences of the Five 
Certificate Policy and collected further information about student  enrollment and policy 
provisions. The great  challenges faced by migrant educators and students stemmed from the 
resource scarcity and precarity of the migrant schools. Furthermore, an analysis of the Five 
Certificate Policy reveals that its implementation differ from district to district within Beijing 
itself. The policy opaqueness and difficulty in meeting all of its provisions has increased the 
exclusion of migrants from the public education system and further disrupted educational 
pathways. Moreover, it has contributed to the precarity faced by migrant schools, exacerbating 
preexisting resource scarcity problems. 
 Going forward, the Beijing government should standardize the Five Certificate Policy 
system, provide resources for migrant students who wish to apply to school enrollment in their 
home provinces, and look to incrementally incorporate migrant schools into the public education 
system. In the long term, as China continues to urbanize and develop smaller, inland cities, the 
national government should invest  in the economic development of these cities and the education 
systems within them so as to create more even distributions of opportunity for all of China’s 
citizens. 
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Chapter 1: Background
Chapter Summary
 This chapter lays out this thesis’ research question and provides the necessary 
background information to understand the scope of migrant education in China. It summarizes 
the economic, political, and social trends since 1978 that have given rise to the hundreds of 
millions of Chinese migrant workers. These migrant workers often bring their children with them 
as they look for work, and hundreds of “migrant schools” have popped up in Beijing to serve 
these children who cannot attend public school. However, the introduction of the Five Certificate 
Policy  in Beijing has made it significantly  more difficult for migrant  students to access 
education.  
Research Questions
What challenges do migrant schools in Beijing face while providing education to the city’s 
migrant children? Relatedly, how has Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy ameliorated or 
exacerbated these challenges?    
Born Unequal: the hukou system
 First, what is a “migrant”? The term “migrants” refers to the Chinese citizens who have 
moved domestically, usually from China’s poorer, more rural inland provinces to its developed 
east coast cities. Beijing’s migrant education situation is shaped by a sociopolitical and historical 
context decades in the making. In Chinese policy, “migrant children” refers to children aged 6–
14 years who have temporarily  lived as migrants for more than half a year with their parents or 
guardians (Yuan, Fang, Liu et. al. 2013). These children are the sons and daughters of internal 
migrants who have moved to cities looking for work. Yet despite having lived and worked in 
cities, often for years, these migrants are denied access to basic social services, including public 
education for their children.
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 Their status as migrants is due to China’s hukou (户口) household registration system, 
which has existed in various forms since 1951. Under the first hukou system, each Chinese 
citizen was officially registered as either “agricultural” or “nonagricultural,” and their hukou 
designations were then linked to their mother’s place of birth. Having “nonagricultural” hukou 
entitled the holder to accessing social services provided by the local city government, such as 
food rations, housing, medical care, state-provided childcare, pensions, and most importantly  for 
the sake of this study, primary  school education (Démurger et. al. 2009, Wang 2013).1  Today, 
unless migrant parents can transfer their hukou or meet certain requirements, which vary from 
city to city, their children are often shut out of the public education system in whatever city they 
have migrated to for work. 
The Emergence of a “Floating Population”
 Beijing’s millions of migrant workers are the result of drastic reforms in China’s 
economic policy which unleashed a massive rural-urban migration. China’s World Trade 
Organization membership compelled China to make itself more economically competitive in 
global markets (Eckholm 1999). Consequently, China began the gargantuan task of shrinking the 
size of its state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which previously  provided millions with jobs and 
pensions (Ma & Adams 2013). Migration surged as the newly  unemployed went to cities for 
work. Beginning in the 1980s, national policies concentrated resources on developing urban 
areas at the expense of rural regions (Lai 2002). The rural-urban disparity has only been 
exacerbated by China’s export-heavy growth from the 1990s onward (China Labor Bulletin 
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1 The hukou system was meant as a tool for controlling population movement and implementing state developmental 
policies (Cheng & Seldon 1990, Liu 2004). Rapid acceleration of rural-urban migration in the 1950s quickly 
overwhelmed urban governments, which were not equipped to absorb such population increases. Thus, in 1955, the 
Chinese government expanded the hukou system to rural areas in addition to cities and limiting rural-to-urban 
migration (Chan & Li 1999). From 1955 to the 1980s, migration was strictly regulated.
Since the dismantling of village communes in 1982, hukou regulation has been relaxed (Kwong 2004). The central 
government issued a series of documents explicitly requiring local governments to enforce equal opportunities in 
employment and rights for rural migrants (Li and Shi, 2007). Furthermore, rural migrants are not explicitly banned 
from entering cities anymore; the system of ‘‘custody and repatriation,’’ used to deport rural migrants from cities 
ceased after 2003 (Goodburn 2009). Still, any transfer of hukou status from rural to urban remains extremely 
difficult, requiring a hefty fee in more attractive cities, extensive paperwork migrants often lack, and most 
commonly, sponsorship by an urban enterprise or university, perpetuating within the urban fabric a ‘two-class urban 
society’ of rural and urban residents (Amnesty International 2007, Chan 1999).
2009, Chan 2009). Higher urban wages and resources attract millions of migrants and displace 
farmers to cities (Miller 2013). 
  In 2004, China’s State Council Research Office Task estimated there were 120 million 
migrant workers employed in cities (Xinghua & Kun 2007). Today, that number has only 
increased, to 262 million total migrant workers, with 170 million of them traveling to east coast 
cities (Baijie 2013). These migrants have brought with them approximately  23 million children, 
aged between 6 and 14, who are guaranteed compulsory primary  education (Chen & Feng 2013, 
National Census 2010).2
The Xueji system and the Five Certificate Policy 
  This thesis focuses particularly on Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy and its effects on the 
challenges migrant population face in accessing education. In August 2013, the Chinese Ministry 
of Education unveiled a new national education reform that was implemented on September 1, 
2013 in time for the 2013-2014 school year.3  Under this reform, students can now register for 
school and access their educational history by signing up for an electronic school enrollment 
number (xueji, or 学籍). This policy (hereby the xueji policy) aims to “establish a unified 
standard student information management system” with a close eye on the implementation 
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2 Migrant workers have quietly fueled China’s economic and industrial rise since 1978‘s Opening and Reform. The 
successive waves of migrant workers have contributed an estimated 16% to GDP growth annually for the last two 
decades (UNESCO Report 2006).  However, these workers remain politically, economically, and socially 
marginalized from the growing Chinese middle class. For example, migrants and their children are a marginalized 
population in urban spaces. Migrants work long hours (11 hours per day on average, 26 days a month) and are paid 
half as much: 780 yuan a month as compared to 1350 yuan among urban residents (CLB 2009, Tan 2010). The 
majority of migrant workers are self-employed in the informal sector. They suffer higher rates of job mobility, 
workplace abuse, injury,  and seldom have sign official employment contracts (Amnesty International 2007, 
Démurger et. al.  2009). Migrants and their children also suffer widespread discrimination; urban residents regard 
them as lazy, ignorant, dirty, and contributors to crime (Goodburn 2009).
Migrants remain geographically marginal as well; they usually occupy semi-permanent “urban villages” on the 
periphery of large cities like Beijing, Shenzhen, and Shanghai (Wang & Wu 2009). However, since the first wave of 
internal immigration in the early 1980s, migrants are becoming younger, more well-educated, and urban (Liang & 
Chen 2007, CLB). Since 2000, “second generation migrants,” the children of migrant workers, have been entering 
the workforce as well. The children of first generation migrants, these new workers have higher aspirations and grew 
up in an urban setting, but are still excluded from the urban fabric (Jialing 2012).
3 韩基韬. "中⼩小学⽣生9⽉月将实⾏行统⼀一学籍管理 终⾝身"⼀一⼈人⼀一号" (Middle School to Elementary School Students 
Begin Implementation of Student Management, “one person one number” system in September) Cri.cn, 22 Aug. 
2013. Web. <http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2013/08/22/5311s4227313.htm>. 
details," effectively develop  educational training,” and effect the “establishment of long-term 
mechanism to strengthen school management.” However, Beijing has supplemented this national 
policy with the addition of its own, city-specific policy to accommodate its large migrant 
populations. In January 2014, Beijing began the Five Certificate Policy  (my translation) for 
migrants. The policy  allows migrant students to obtain a school enrollment number under the 
national policy but only  after they  have secured a set of five “certificates,” or items of 
paperwork, to qualify. What these five certificates cover and their specific requirements will be 
covered later on. The Five Certificate Policy is thus a policy applicable to Beijing only  and was 
implemented as a mechanism for complying with the national xueji policy. 
The Legal Framework for Education
 Despite the marginalized status of migrant workers and their children, China nominally 
possesses an explicit international and domestic legal framework that clearly guarantees the 
provision of education for children 6 and 14, regardless of place of birth and hukou status. 
However, this legal framework is hobbled by a decentralized education system, resulting in a 
sharp gap between law and reality.   
 China’s current constitution, adopted in 1982, universalizes compulsory primary education 
under articles Articles 19 and 46.4 Moreover, the 1986 Compulsory  Education Law mandated 
compulsory, “socialist education” to be provided for children ages 6-14 regardless of regardless 
of their ethnicity, race, occupation and financial status (Article 5). The law also banned charging 
tuition fees, mandated a subsidy system for financially disadvantaged students (Article 37), 
entrusted public schools with protecting the right of all children’s access to education (Article 
29), and gave students equal rights in enrollment and continuation (Article 36).
 However, the 1986 Law also gave the responsibility for the implementation of compulsory 
education to local authorities (Chunli 2006). Villages now administer primary schools, township 
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4 “Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the duty as well as the right to receive education.” This language 
was echoed in the 1991 Law on the Protection of Minors, in Article 9, which lists a minor’s right to education.
governments administer junior high schools, and counties administer secondary schools (Zhao 
2009). With their newly invested authority, local authorities then interpreted the ambiguous 
language of the law to mean they were obligated to provide education only to the children of 
residents with local hukou. In the interim period after the 1986 Compulsory  Law, the central 
government passed several non-binding edicts strengthening guidelines towards migrant 
children, but none had measurable impacts (Jialing 2004). In 2001 and 2003, the Education 
Ministry set out  two initiatives that mandated local authorities were not only responsible but 
legally  obligated to provide education to migrant children (UNESCO 2006). In response, most 
municipalities issued their own regulations, creating prohibitively high transaction costs for entry 
into public schools.5 
 Most recently in 2006, the National People’s Congress, under pressure from migrants, 
NGOs, and domestic media, revised the 1986 Compulsory  Education Law to read under Article 
12: 
“For school-age children and adolescents whose parents or other statutory guardians 
work or reside in places other than the places of their registered residence and who 
have to receive compulsory education in the places where their parents or other 
statutory guardians work or reside, the local people’s governments shall provide 
equal conditions for them to receive compulsory education.”
 
 However, the wording is vague about implementation, and consequently, public schools 
interpreted the legislation to mean they  could use prohibitively difficult exams to prevent migrant 
enrollment. Some continued to charge illegal temporary schooling fees despite exhortations from 
the State Council in 2008 demanding compliance with the 2006 Compulsory  Law (Chunli 2006). 
Lan 2014). 
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5 For example, a 2004 Shanghai communiqué requires migrants to have an extensive range of documentation from 
the government of their place of origin as well as documentation from “relevant” (not specified) departments and 
units in the Shanghai municipal government certifying they came to the city only for work and a certificate 
demonstrating that s/he has a legal, fixed, place of abode in the city and has been living there for a “certain” amount 
of time (again, not specified) (Amnesty International 2007).
Education Options for Migrant Children
 Despite these legal provisions that promise them primary school education, migrant 
children for the most part remain effectively excluded from the public education system. 
Consequently, they have to pay high fees to enroll at public schools, return to the countryside to 
attend school where they  have hukou, or enroll at migrant schools in the city. Each option has its 
own advantages and disadvantages. 
 In order to discourage migrant enrollment and boost funds, public schools will charge 
prohibitively high school fees for non-urban residents.6  Still, the majority of migrant parents 
(about 70%) bring their children with them to cities to attend migrant schools (National Family 
Planning Commission 2010). In reaction, migrant schools appeared in migrant-heavy cities in the 
1990s, largely as self-started projects. The first  opened in Beijing in 1993 and in Shanghai in 
1992 (Jialing 2004, Zhu 2001). The schools developed rapidly after 1998 due to more welcoming 
policies towards migrant education. Today, there are about 100 to 200 migrant schools in Beijing. 
There are no official statistics for the current number of Beijing migrant schools because of their 
high mobility.7 Estimates for Shanghai migrant schools before 2008 vary widely, from about 250 
serving about 40,000 children to more than 500 serving 120,000 students (Nielson et. al 2006). 
The majority of these migrant schools have been shut down since 2008.
 Ensuring quality in migrant schools continues to be a problem due to a lack of regulatory 
framework and political attention. Because of the difficulty of meeting health and educational 
requirements to obtain official recognition, migrant schools voluntarily elect to remain 
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6 From 1996 to 2008/2009, any migrant child in a big city like Beijing had to pay two government fees to enroll in a 
public school: an ‘‘education compensation fee’’ (教育补偿费) of 1000 RMB per semester and a ‘‘temporary 
schooling fee’’ (借读费) of 680 RMB per semester. There were an additional 15 other miscellaneous fees. More 
prestigious public schools can charge between 10,000-30,000RMB in “sponsorship fees” (Tan 2010).  Given that the 
average income of a migrant worker was 780 yuan per month in 2009, these school tuition fees represent an 
enormous financial burden (CLB 2009). Non-financial barriers also exist, like requiring official residence and 
employment documentation migrant parents often lack. As a result, 20% of all migrant children have no access to 
public schools and 46.9% of six year old migrant children weren’t enrolled in school (Amnesty International 2007).
7 Workers at Project BEAM and New Worker NGO in Beijing tell me it is around 300 now, given the many that 
were closed to prepare for the 2008 Beijing Olympics (Notes 2013). The New Citizen’s Plan NGO estimates there to 
be approximately 150 schools in 2014. 
unlicensed and therefore illegal. Their legal precariousness prevents administrators from 
investing in long-term infrastructural improvements. Bad lighting, ventilation, overcrowding, 
and poor facilities detract from migrants’ educational experiences (Jialing 2004). Almost all 
migrant schools are for-profit and are run like businesses by  administrators who have little 
experience in education (Notes 2013, Goodburn 2009, Jialing 2004). In a survey of Shanghai 
public and migrant elementary schools, researchers found children attending migrant schools 
performed significantly worse in Chinese and Mathematics than their public school counterparts 
(Chen & Feng 2013). Migrant children gain a better primary school education in migrant schools 
than in rural schools but quickly fall behind in comparison to students in public schools (Lai et. 
al. 2012). A lack of standardization pervades their curriculum and student composition; students 
of all ages and educational backgrounds may be put in the same class (Zhao 2009, Goodburn 
2009, Jialing 2004). Furthermore, most existing migrant schools have been pushed to the 
geographic fringe of urban spaces, making them sometimes hard to reach (Li 2011, Shanghai 
Statistics Bureau 2011).8
 
 Worryingly, the transition between primary to secondary schools continues to be a problem. 
While approximately  90% of migrant children go to primary  school, only 20% go on to junior 
middle schools. There is no supervision or regulatory system for enrollment, dropout, graduation, 
and quality education for migrant children under the age of 16—the age at which they enter the 
workforce. Those who wish to take the college entrance examination (高考, gaokao) must still, 
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8  Schools like Beijing’s Xingzhi School serve to illustrate the conditions of migrant schools. Despite its name 
recognition,  conditions at Xingzhi were far worse than those at public schools.  Only 25% of the teachers had official 
education certificates (national regulations mandate all teachers must be certified).  In general, teachers at migrant 
schools are poorly paid; a survey of 59 Shanghai migrant schools showed that 78.3% of teachers made income of 
700RMB or less in 2002, whereas average of local office worker was 2,815RMB. According to Project BEAM, a 
Beijing education nonprofit, a “high” migrant teacher salary in 2013 was 2000RMB (Notes 2013).  Only 66% had 
high school or secondary school education (Tan 2010).  Turnover is high, even among the best migrant schools 
(Notes 2013).
In 2004, Xingzhi had three separate locations, one of which was a middle school, with 3,500 students enrolled 
(Kwong 2004, Xing). Named after Tao Xingzhi, a 20th century educator, the school was started in 1994 by Li 
Shumei and her husband Yi Benyao, who had moved from Henan to Beijing to work as street vendors. Li, a former 
teacher, began teaching nine students in sheds on a former vegetable plot, charging 40 yuan per person. Li’s students 
quickly grew in number and after moving locations several times,  settled down in a former paint factory with the 
donation of 10,000USD from an overseas Chinese American. Other entrepreneurial businesspeople followed Li’s 
example; by 1999, Li was one of over 100 unlicensed migrant schools in Beijing. Xingzhi also garnered the support 
of a cadre in the State Council who lived close to the original school and various social organizations in China, 
which may have contributed to its longevity. For more information on Xingzhi, see Jialing 2010 and Kwong 2004. 
generally  speaking, travel back to the countryside to complete high school at a significant 
disadvantage because 11 out of 22 provinces use specialized textbooks and curriculum. 
Consequently, migrant students must learn the provincial curriculum before taking the college 
entrance exam. The overall result is a perpetuation of class inequalities from migrant generation 
to generation (Wu & Qi 2013).
Efforts at Reform
  The dilemma of migrant education attracted more public attention and official resources 
during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Historically, Chinese cities have a record of half-hearted, 
patchwork attempts to address hukou and migrant education problems. Reform efforts can be 
traced back to 1993, where reform plan called for the gradual abolition of urban and rural hukou 
9 (Amnesty International 2007). In 1996, China’s State Education Commission released the Trial 
Measures for the Schooling of Children and Youth Among the Floating Population in Cities and 
Towns, an experimental reform effort and limited to only certain areas in particular cities. 
Beijing has tried a number of limited experiments in migrant education, though the autonomy of 
its districts makes it difficult to enact widespread change (Kwong 2004, HRIC 2002). In 2009, 
the governments of Wuhan, Nanjing, Beijing, Chongqing, and Haikou officially abolished 
temporary schooling and miscellaneous other fees for migrant  children, though it is unclear how 
successfully this was implemented (Jialing 2010). 
 As of 2012, some Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shanghai migrants will be eligible to take the 
gaokao in the city  rather than having to return back to the countryside. The gaokao changes will 
start in 2014 in Shanghai (China Daily 2013). Still, only a few thousand students actually qualify 
to take the gaokao under these new regulations
 Shanghai has undertaken the most drastic reform efforts. After several years of pilot 
research programs in three of its districts, Shanghai announced in its Eleventh Five-Year plan to 
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9  The 1993 reform plan would have replaced the distinction instead with the categories of permanent hukou, 
temporary hukou, and guest hukou. It also proposed diverting migration to smaller cities and towns, while giving 
authority for determining the requirements to obtain permanent hukou to local authorities. Hukou reform plans that 
followed have been largely based on this 1993 plan.
extend free and compulsory for all children (HRIC 2002). Thus, in 2008 the city declared the 
beginning of its "three-year action plan." The plan aimed to enroll 70% of Shanghai’s migrant 
children in public primary schools by 2010 and 100% of migrant students in junior high schools. 
Starting in 2007, of the 258 unlicensed migrant schools, all were closed save for 23. 
Approximately  150-160 new schools were created in their place. Migrant schools that  met city 
standards for facility  and curriculum quality received government funding and became public 
schools, particularly in peripheral regions. Other migrant schools were bought out by the 
Shanghai government, which replaced all the management with their own hires. The rest were 
started from scratch (Lan 2014, Li 2011). 10 However, no public follow-up investigation of 
Shanghai’s reform has been conducted as of yet. Nationally, Chinese migrant education remains 
a salient problem yet unresolved by national or local policy.
Migrant Schools in Beijing Today
 Despite the prevalence of Beijing migrant schools and previous pushes for reform, very 
little literature exists about Beijing migrant schools after 2011, perhaps because attention shifted 
away from migrant education after the end of the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Beginning in 2006, 
Beijing authorities began closing down more than 50 migrant schools in preparation for the 
Olympics (Human Rights Watch 2006). Since the Olympics, beginning in 2011, the Beijing 
government began another round of migrant school closures (Sohu 2014). Often, Beijing 
authorities cited poor safety standards and illegal residence as excuses to close down schools, 
with no prior notification (China Gate “我有话说”).  Beijing migrant schools have responded 
accordingly  to these pressures. While previously there were about 240 migrant schools of 
varying sizes in Beijing in 2011, today there remain only approximately 150 (Notes 2013, Yan 
2012). The numbers of migrant children in Beijing are growing at approximately 40,000 a year, 
however (Cheung 2012). This mirrors Beijing’s most recent population statistics, which shows 
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10 Under these reforms, students no longer need to pay schooling fees of any sort, though they do have to pay for 
uniforms, class materials,  and field trips.  Schools receiving migrant children are eligible to receive public subsidies 
of 4500RMB per pupil to cover tuition costs (Chen & Feng 2013). By 2009, 69% of migrant children were enrolled 
in public schools (up from 49% in 2005),  only 3% of migrant children attended unlicensed migrant schools, and the 
remaining 28% went to the newly state-sponsored private schools. The Three Year Action Plan was lauded as a 
widespread success though it is unclear whether such figures match reality (Shanghai Migrant Children’s Bluebook).
that the city’s citizenry has steadily grown to exceed 21 million at the end of 2013; 38% of those 
living in Beijing, however, do not have Beijing urban hukou but have registered with the Beijing 
government (Sina 2014). Another estimated 10 million workers are unregistered but reside in the 
larger Beijing metropolitan area (Crothall 2009).
 Because Beijing remains a top  receiver of government attention and economic resources 
and is the home of the country’s best universities, it remains one of the most popular destinations 
for China’s internal migrants. Thus, migrant education in Beijing remains the most developed 
among China’s largest cities, the best studied, but also the most vulnerable to governmental 
interference. A study of migrant school closures by  province from 2001-2012 records the long 
history Beijing has with migrant school closures (253 closures total) as compared to other major 
Chinese cities, though such closures are spreading to more western provinces like Xinjiang 
(Wallace 2014). 
 Moreover, as part of a new push for massive urbanization, the Chinese government 
announced after the 2013 Third Plenum official moves towards relaxing hukou policy in medium 
to small-sized cities (Baijie 2013). Developing cities such as Chengdu and Chongqing have 
already been experimenting with more inclusive hukou policies (The Economist, Sheng 2011). 
Relaxations in hukou policy could allow migrant  children easier access to public education in the 
future (Chan 2010). However, it is unclear how these current and future hukou reforms will 
affect the migrant education situation in populous cities such as Beijing. 
 In the face of so much uncertainty, understanding the effects of the “Five Certificate 
Policy” in Beijing will be crucial for understanding the future of migrant education in China. 
This thesis attempts to fill the gap  in literature on migrant education in Beijing on the current 
state of migrant education in Beijing, specifically with regards to the city’s new “Five 
Certificate” policy implemented early 2014. Again, what challenges do migrant schools in 
Beijing face while providing education to the city’s migrant children? Relatedly, how has 
Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy ameliorated or exacerbated these challenges?   
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Chapter 2: Methodology
 Research consisted of four parts: outreach, interviews with migrant actors, data collection 
of policy and demographic information, and finally, data analysis. 
1. Outreach was completed in during my two research trips to Beijing. In December and 
January, I spent four weeks meeting with organizations, researchers, and teachers involved in 
migrant education. Through contacts made during this trip, in May I was able to spend four 
weeks working in conjunction with the New Citizens’ Group, a nonprofit migrant education 
organization headquartered in Beijing. Through the New Citizen’s Group, I was able to contact 
migrant school principals and coordinate site visits. Migrant schools were selected based on their 
location (a wide variety  of locations in migrant-heavy  districts were chosen) and the 
receptiveness of the migrant  school principals. I conducted additional interviews with relevant 
researchers, academics, nonprofits, and artists who I identified through media and the academic 
literature. 
2. Interviewing with approximately  40 migrant schoolteachers, administrators, parents, and 
researchers took place in December/January 2013 and May 2014. Interviews were supplemented 
by classroom observations and school visits at migrant schools. Interviews always took place at 
the individual’s work place. Teachers and principals were interviewed at their respective schools; 
parents were interviewed where they  worked (often a workshop or social work center); 
researchers and academics were interviewed in their offices. The interviews lasted approximately 
30 - 45 minutes each. Interviews with teachers and principals were followed by  classroom 
observations and a tour of the school. Generally, I stayed at least an entire school day  at each 
migrant school. Interviews with all subjects were semi-structured; a set of questions was 
prepared but answers were open-ended, and follow-up questions were spontaneous. Interviews 
were not recorded, though I took detailed notes and quotations during the interviews. 
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 The school visit survey and questionnaire I used for each migrant school visit can be found 
in Appendix 1. Interview questions were designed to glean basic information about the school’s 
financial, political, and operational conditions (how many students, whether or not the school 
had a license, the principal’s background, the school’s relationship with local officials). More 
open-ended questions were designed to allow interviewees to offer opinions on recent 
developments regarding migrant schools (Has the Five Certificate System affected your school 
and students negatively or positively? How?). Interviews were less to gather factual information, 
though that certainly was a motivation for conducting them. Rather, interviews provided valuable 
access to the migrant experience and the subjective perception of policies. See Appendix 2 for a 
table with descriptions of each of the schools visited in the course of this research and a list of all 
interview subjects.
3. Data collection of school enrollment information and Five Certificate Policy  information took 
place after interviews. In conjunction with the New Citizen’s Group, I collected statistics about 
migrant and public schools and graduation and enrollment rates in various Chinese cities 
including Beijing with the New Citizens’ Group. Furthermore, I took pictures of various “Five 
Certificate” announcement posters that had been posted in migrant  communities around Beijing. 
I compiled demographic information on migrant and urban school enrollment numbers and 
number of schools by  going through census reports on Beijing district websites. I supplemented 
migrant school information with data from New Citizens’ Groups’ annual migrant school map 
project, where every Beijing migrant school’s location, contact information, and basic enrollment 
and school fee information are aggregated. This visual and quantitative data provided a 
framework for the policies at the heart of this study. Altogether, the interviews and collected data 
furnished a more complete picture of the challenges facing migrant  students in Beijing and how 
these challenges are affected by Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy. 
The Schools Visited
 In the course of this thesis, I visited eight migrant schools. Table 1 describes the schools 
visited and the migrant populations of each district in Beijing. 
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Table 1. Migrant Population and Schools By District 
District Schools Urban Migrant Ratio Schools Visited
Interviews 
Done
Chaoyang 134 46000 72780 0.63
3 (Tongxin Elementary School, 
Chaoyang Migrant School, 
Future Bilingual Elementary 
School) 6
Haidian 108 87792 53637 1.64
1 (Beijing East Wind Elementary 
School) 2
Fengtai 84 24239 44601 0.54
1 (Blue Skies Elementary 
School) 3
Fangshan 211 51596 34793 1.48 0
Tongzhou 82 12077 34618 0.35 0
Changping 100 9670 33828 0.29
2 (Little Swan Elementary 
School, Bai Miao Experimental 
Middle School) 5
Daxin 96 11423 32315 0.35 1 (Dandelion Middle School) 5
Xicheng 72 43310 17375 2.49 0
Shunyi 42 10300 16777 0.61 0
Dongcheng 64 35758 13333 2.68 0
Shijingshang 31 9934 12969 0.77 0
Huairou 25 5038 5665 0.89 0
Miyun 40 7809 4278 1.83 0
Mentougou 29 3493 3933 0.89 0
Pingrou 43 6211 3184 1.95 0
Yangqing 34 4559 2379 1.92 0
Total/
Average 1195 369209 386465 1.21 8 migrant schools
 The migrant schools I visited fell within the most migrant-heavy districts on the outskirts 
of urban Beijing. From the table, we can see that Chaoyang District, as Beijing’s largest  and 
most populous district, has the most migrant students, and I accordingly visited three schools in 
Chaoyang. Two other districts I visited - Changping and Daxing - are overwhelmingly  migrant 
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districts; their ratio of urban to migrant students falls well below 1. Unsurprisingly, the districts 
with the lowest proportion of migrant students are in the central urban areas of Beijing and the 
districts with the highest proportion of migrant students are farther out along Beijing’s urban 
edges. This trend breaks down when we reach the districts that comprise rural Beijing, most 
likely because the kinds of jobs that normally sustain migrant workers - construction, cleaning, 
operating street side small shops - do not exist in rural areas. 
4. Data analysis of the interviews first involved thematic analysis. I treated interviews as a 
literary  text subject to close reading and interpretation. During reading, I coded for reoccurring 
themes and relevance to preexisting literature on migrant education. I compared these themes 
with themes already noted and themes identified in the academic literature to see if they were 
new or corresponding to themes I had already identified. I discarded segments that did not fit, 
and new themes often emerged upon second reading. I went through this iterative process - close 
reading, thematic analysis, and close rereading - several times. Separately, I analyzed the 
numerical data with questions of migrant school location and enrollment in mind. Finally, I 
analyzed the quantitative and qualitative data in conjunction with one another and examined 
similarities and contradictions between the two sets of data.
Limitations 
 The migrant schools visited in this thesis were not representative of the location and 
quality of migrant schools in Beijing. Rather, they were selected based on the receptiveness of 
their principals and thus the feasibility  of my research there. It is possible that willingness to 
participate in my  research acted as a selecting mechanism for certain traits, such as higher 
curriculum quality or more affluent conditions. However, the sample of migrant schools included 
here included a variety of districts, sizes, and school background. Moreover, given the transient 
and unpredictable nature of migrant schools, choosing a representative sample was nearly 
impossible. 
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Chapter 3: Current Challenges
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I discuss the longstanding challenges faced by migrant schools in their 
daily operations and how these challenges translate into the educational experience of migrant 
children.
The Biggest Challenges
  In the course of visiting eight migrant schools and one vocational high school which 
accepted migrants, I saw reoccurring problems in each school. The biggest challenges facing the 
schools I visited largely stemmed from the environment of resource scarcity in which migrant 
schools operate. Below are other, major challenges I found in the visit migrant schools I visited.   
1. Migrant school principals cited the inability to retain quality teachers their biggest 
problem. Similarly, principal background and experience in education varied greatly and 
served as a predictor of school quality and retaining teachers. 
2. Relatedly, the struggle to keep their school financially viable without charging high school 
fees was a continual challenge. 
3. Ensuring the safety of their students was a surprising challenge principals cited as a 
constant concern of theirs. Surprisingly, student mobility was not cited as a major challenge 
by migrant principals. 
4. Migrant schoolteachers and administrators often act as more than just teachers, but as 
friends, pseudo-parents, and social workers for the students they teach. However, they 
struggled to fill these roles with limited resources. 
5. Educational continuity for migrant students is an obstacle. Many migrant students find it 
difficult to complete an educational pathway leading to university study because of obstacles 
at each step in the educational system. 
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1.  Retaining Teachers
 Because of the limited financial resources of migrant schools and the lack of public 
funding, migrant schools pay their teachers about half of what a public school pays. 
Consequently, teachers often work at a migrant school for a short period of time before moving 
on to another school posting. Teachers are often young and inexperienced and use teaching at  a 
migrant school to boost their future chances of employment at another school. Moreover, 
teachers without proper credentials often find employment at migrant schools, which do not 
always enforce high teacher standards. 
  Table 2 below lists each school’s teachers, qualifications, salary, and retention rate. In 
public schools, teachers must have at least an undergraduate degree if not a master degree or 
even a doctorate. In every migrant school I visited (and which was willing to talk about their 
teachers’ qualifications) however, teachers had for the most part earned their zhuanke (专科), a 
vocational degree that  certifies one to teach but lacked an undergraduate bachelor’s degree. On 
the whole, migrant schools get second pick with hiring teachers due to the schools’ lower 
salaries, lack of social benefits, and poor living conditions. 
  Interestingly, I found the majority  migrant schoolteachers were migrant themselves, even 
more so than school principals. The vast majority were “外地人,” or “foreigners” to Beijing. 
Those that did have urban Beijing hukou had invariable married a Beijing citizen and thus gained 
Beijing residence status. At Bai Miao Experimental Middle School, for example, all 30 teachers 
were “foreigners” to Beijing. Of the eight migrant schools I visited, about 80% of the teachers 
were migrants to Beijing. Foreigners at  a disadvantage when seeking employment in Beijing 
were drawn to migrant schools, where employment requirements may not be as stringent.
 Table 2 below documenting the teacher salary  and teacher mobility  at each of the migrant 
schools that I visited. The most common salary  I found at  migrant schools was 2,000 RMB (a 
little more than $300) a month for entry-level teachers. A salary of 3,000 RMB a month would be 
considered “high” in migrant schools. Dandelion, by  far the most well-funded and well-
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connected migrant school, was able to pay teachers on a sliding scale that maxed out at 6,000 
RMB based on experience, degree level, and hours worked. Almost all the migrant principals I 
talked to said that if they  had extra revenue, their first act would be to increase teacher salary to 
reflect rising living costs in Beijing. In comparison, a teacher at a Chinese public school makes at 
least 6,000 RMB a month. In general, schools with a higher monthly  salary had slightly higher 
teacher retention rates. 
Table 2: Teacher Salary and Retention Rate by School
School Salary % who leave each 
semester
Teacher qualifications
Tongxin Elementary School 
(同心小学)
2000 RMB/
semester
Unclear
Dandelion Middle School (蒲
公英中学) 
2000-6000 
RMB/
semester
2-5% (1-2 out of 48) 80% have zhuanke, 20% 
have undergraduate degree 
Little Swan (⼩小天鹅⼩小学) 
Elementary School
3000 a 
month
Unclear
Blue Skies (蓝天凤元）
Elementary School
2,200 a 
month
Unclear 50% undergraduate degree
12% have graduate degree
8% have zhuanke
30% unlicensed
Future Bilingual School （未
来双语学校）
3000 a 
month
5-10% a semester 
(1-2 out of 23)
25% have undergraduate 
degree
75% have zhuanke
Migrant school in Chaoyang 
district
2000 a 
month
5-10% (1-2 out of 
21) 
30% have undergraduate 
degree
70% have zhuanke
Bai Miao (⽩白庙实验学校) 
Experimental Elementary 
School
2000 a 
month
30% (10 out of 30 a 
semester) 
20% have undergraduate 
degree
30% have zhuanke
50% unlicensed, but have 
experience teaching in other 
migrant schools 
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School Salary % who leave each 
semester
Teacher qualifications
Beijing East Wind Love and 
Hope Elementary School (北
京⻛风华爱⼼心希望⼩小学)
2000 a 
month
Less than 10% (1 a 
semester)
100% zhuanke
 Relatedly, the quality  of school principals and school administration were influential in 
determining school quality. In other words, the educational background and personal 
commitment of the principal almost always correlated with a more successful migrant school, 
measured by longevity of the school, lower student fees, higher teacher retention rates, and 
quality of school resources. A surprising number of migrant  schools had principals who were 
also the school’s founder. Tongxin, East Wind, Blue Skies, Dandelion, and Future Bilingual 
School were all founded or co-founded by their current principals, all of whom (with the 
exception of Tongxin) had previous teaching experience. In the case of Little Swan Elementary 
School, the principal had a background in aerospace engineering but had had a long volunteer 
history of the school and developed a close relationship with the previous principal. These 
schools tended to be the more well run schools with lower school fees, happier teachers, and 
more well maintained classrooms. A possible explanation between this observed relationship is 
that principals who founded the school and stayed for many  years would have more a personal 
investment in running the school. 
 From interviews, I found the ability of a migrant school principal to be the best predictor 
of migrant  school quality. Teachers always mentioned the (positive and negative) influence their 
principals had on their work experience and school administration.  This reflects the personality-
driven nature of these private migrant schools. In some ways, this is an advantage, because 
successful migrant schools are more quickly adaptive. Yet this also leaves schools vulnerable to 
sudden changes related to leadership switches. Furthermore, without support from other teachers 
and the public education system, embattled school principals often find themselves overwhelmed 
with the exigencies of running a migrant school. 
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  The following story with a teacher I met at Xiao Tian’E Elementary  School is 
emblematic of the influence a principal has on his/her migrant school. Teacher Wu, a middle-
aged English teacher who taught at a nearby migrant school, was dissatisfied with his current 
employer and was seeking employment at Xiao Tian’E, having heard good things about its 
principal:
“At the school where I teach, the principal doesn’t know what he is doing. He runs it 
completely from a financial perspective and doesn’t  listen to the teachers’ input. I’m here 
looking for a new job because I heard this school is well run. The principal [where I 
work] is very young and just graduated from a nearby Beijing university. The reason why 
he is successful is that he is good at promotion and publicity; that’s how he got so many 
kids [to attend his school]. Here’s an example of his lack of background in education; he 
bought the set of books for the English curriculum. In the cities, English starts in Grade 1, 
whereas in rural schools, it starts in Grade 3. Well, he bought the city texts for Grades 1-2 
and the texts for rural schools for Grade 3 and onwards, which means kids are repeating 
two years of English. He didn’t know to buy the complete set for cities because he has no 
background in education whatsoever. He doesn’t know many things at all.”11
 Feeling that his perspective and experience was being disregarded by shoddy 
administration, Teacher Wu was secretively  looking for another job. Because of the private, for-
profit nature of many of Beijing’s migrant  schools, the principal in his story had inordinate 
influence in determining aspects of the curriculum, teacher training and compensation, and 
enrollment. Such poor administration exacerbates the already poor teacher retention of migrant 
schools. 
  Several additional themes emerge from Teacher Wu’s narrative that are indicative of the 
disproportionate impact a principal has on the future success and quality of a migrant school. The 
principal at his school is “very young and just graduated from a nearby Beijing university.” 
Teacher Wu was unclear about his boss’ area of study but knew it was not  education. The 
principal’s young age speaks to his inexperience, unlike some migrant school principals and 
founders who have worked previously as public or private school teachers before retiring. 
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11 "Interview with Teacher Wu." Personal interview. 21 May 2014.
Moreover, it suggests the possibility  that Teacher Wu’s principal, as a young, recent college 
graduate, viewed running a migrant  school as more of a start up  business than an institution of 
education. 
 Teacher Wu’s comments about the specific textbooks used at his migrant school is also 
consistent with observations in the literature about the generally  poorer quality  of the curriculum 
provided at migrant schools (Zhang 2014). All nine of the school principals I interviewed assured 
me that the curriculum they used was no different than the national curriculum designed by the 
Chinese Ministry  of Education and on par with all national standards of education. However, 
Professor Zhang of Renmin University  noted in her own fieldwork, there exist different levels of 
difficulty for each set of textbooks, and migrant schools often choose to purchase the easiest, and 
cheapest, versions. This allows schools to provide a less rigorous education, while still remaining 
consistent with national education standards.12 In contrast, in elite Beijing high schools, teachers 
even go as far as to develop their own supplementary curriculum and course materials, which are 
jealously guarded by school administration from other elite high schools.13 
  Finally, Teacher Wu’s story suggests that involving teachers in school administration 
decisions and giving them a stake in the running of the school are important  for retaining 
teachers by  partially offsetting the economic disadvantages of working at a migrant school.  One 
of the migrant schools I visited in Haidian district - Beijing East  Wind - was notable for it’s 
smoothly  run day to day operations and their array  of extracurricular activities for both students 
and parents. This programming was especially  impressive given the small staff the principal was 
working with (12 full time teachers for 500 students; the other academic obligations were picked 
up by part time and volunteer teachers). As the principal told me:
“One thing I have done very well has been to build teacher relations and a feeling of 
unity. Even though I can’t pay  them much, I put in a lot of effort to establish a friendly 
environment where people feel like they can be heard, their opinion valued, and their 
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12 "Interview with Zhang Donghui." Personal interview. 5 June 2014.
13 "Interview with Wang Rui." Personal interview. 1 May 2014. 
efforts noticed. I also have very  good relationships with parents as well. I don’t look 
down upon parents or students because of their backgrounds, because they are poor, they 
are badly  dressed, or have no education. I think that every child is lovable and has the 
ability to be successful.” 
 As a result of the care this principal took to accommodate her teachers’ perspectives and 
work, the teachers in turn were willing to work overtime without extra pay to help the principal 
put on the extracurricular and educational activities planned after the normal school day. These 
observations are reflected in the short story  of Teacher Wang, a grammar teacher at  Little Swan 
Elementary School, as well:
“I come from Hebei province. Technically, where I live is still part  of Beijing; it’s just 
one of the very far flung districts. I taught there at a private school for ten years, where 
some of the students were migrants. I came to this school in 2013. I work four hours 
away from where I live now [in Beijing]. I used to work at another school in the southeast 
corner of city, but I found it too repressive there. No one listened to me, and teachers 
were not appreciated for any extra work they  put in. Even if pay there was higher, it 
wasn’t enjoyable. My  impression of this school [Little Swan] is that it is very good. 
Before, I had friends here who said was the principal was very good and good to the 
students. I was very moved by his dedication; he only ate leftovers in the cafeteria and 
put everything into the school.” 
 Little Swan Elementary School - a four hour bus ride away from her family  home - was 
farther away than where she had worked previously, though she was still able to visit her family 
every  weekend. Teacher Wang did have her teaching certificate and had taught previously at 
another private school but was willing to forgo a higher salary and proximity to her family to 
work at a school where she respected the principal and felt  that she had the license to make a 
contribution.
 The influence of principals on migrant schools is a two-way street and a challenge which 
migrant schools continue to balance. Ambitious, experienced, and highly  committed principals 
can successfully shape a migrant school but this approach leaves the school susceptible to 
changes in leadership and problems which require the efforts of more than one person to solve. 
 
25
2. Keeping Financially Afloat 
 Because migrant  schools are usually  excluded from the public finance system, they must 
raise all their revenue independently. Exceptions do exist; as will be described in Chapter 4, Blue 
Skies Elementary School in Fengtai District, for example, receives annual public grants, and 
Dandelion Middle School receives numerous philanthropic donations from corporations and 
wealthy individuals. However, for the most part, migrant  schools largely rely on the school fees, 
which students pay per semester. Six of the eight  migrant schools I visited relied on this fee-
driven model of financing. Below in Table 3 are the fees for each of the schools visited. To give 
some context, the average Beijing migrant worker earned 2,300 yuan in 2012 (Reuters 2013). 
Table 3: Per Semester School Fee by School
School Fee
Tongxin Elementary School (同心小学), 1,000/semester 
Dandelion Middle School (蒲公英中学) 680/semester (for everything)
Little Swan (小天鹅小学) Elementary School 980/semester for everything including social 
insurance
Blue Skies Elementary School (蓝天凤元） 750/semester
Future Bilingual School （未来双语学校） 1,500/month which covers everything
Migrant school in Chaoyang district 2000/semester, including books
Bai Miao Experimental Elementary School (白
庙实验学校)
1,300 a month for just school (no food, 
uniform, textbook)
Beijing East Wind Love and Hope Elementary 
School (北京⻛风华爱心希望小学)
1,300/semester, includes everything including 
social insurance
 School fees varied widely. The highest was 2000 RMB a semester for all expenses 
(nearly the average of a 2012 Beijing migrant worker’s monthly salary). Dandelion had the 
lowest fee at 680 RMB a semester which covered all school expenses including room and board. 
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It was unclear why some migrant schools were far more expensive than others. In the case of 
Dandelion Middle School, their significant fundraising efforts and philanthropic gifts allow them 
to heavily subsidize their students’ education, and the school fees are concomitantly much lower. 
“When we first opened, people didn’t believe us that our school fees were so low,” Liu Kun, a 
graduate coordinator at  Dandelion told me. “They  thought we were a bad school or that we were 
tricking them.” Blue Skies, a unique mixture of public and private school, is also able to offer its 
students a reduced school fee. However, why the migrant school in Chaoyang District required a 
2,000 per semester school fee was not apparent and very well could have either been due to an 
ulterior profit motive or a higher cost of school upkeep (though their teacher salary, at 2,000 a 
month, was not high either). 
 The principal at Beijing East Wind Love and Hope Elementary School detailed her 
financial challenges and balancing the often-opposing goals of paying her teachers well and 
keeping school fees low:  
“My biggest challenge is attracting good teachers. Teacher mobility is not that  high, and 
sometimes one will leave each semester. Most of the teachers are now younger. Their pay 
is 2000 RMB a month. I’m working to get it higher, but costs are high because I have to 
pay rent for the courtyard, and that’s 100,000 RMB a year.” 
 The courtyard in question was an area of dirt and tile, surrounded by  one-story concrete 
houses that had been brightly  painted in the fashion of many  migrant schools with motivational 
slogans and cartoon animals and flowers. It was located off of the main thoroughfare of a 
migrant settlement, in some of the worst residential conditions I witnessed during my fieldwork: 
unpaved roads bordered on either side by crumbling concrete, huts of brick and sheet metal. 
Reflecting Beijing’s escalating property prices, despite its far-flung geographical location, the 
school’s rental costs still came out to the amount of 100,000 RMB a year (about $16,000). 
Balancing rising operating costs and costs of living, while depending on an ever-changing stream 
of income from transitory migrants impeded principals from investing in long-term school 
improvements and maintaining a high quality of education.
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3. Ensuring Student Safety
 Migrant schools not only operate outside of the public finance system, but those that do 
not have official permission to teach operate largely outside of the public regulatory system as 
well. Local officials will still cite zoning violations or potential dangers to students’ safety  as an 
excuse to shut migrant schools down. Moreover, due to the much higher student mobility at 
migrant schools and the diversity of student backgrounds, principals felt that they had a more 
difficult time enforcing disciplinary  and safety  rules. Principal Yan at Bai Miao Middle School 
described the constant worry he has over student safety: 
“The foremost problem is student safety. Because the school is private, if small accidents 
happen, that is permissible. But if there is a big incident, the authorities might shut down 
the school. I fear constantly  that the students running around will fight each other, run 
around, trip, and hurt themselves.” 
 These unsafe educational conditions are exacerbated by an often fractious home life that 
students return to after school. Dandelion Middle School has gone as far as to require that all 
students live in on-campus dormitories to avoid this problem. At Little Swan Elementary School, 
Teacher Wang saw the tumultuous home lives of her students as proof of the need for migrant 
schools: 
“I feel that  the school does society a lot of help. Most families’ situation here are very 
bad; they rent a tiny apartment and don’t have a good job. There are lots of problems. The 
local government knows about them, but they only  regulate when needed, like if a family 
wants to sue, but they  do not offer them any support. I teach first grade grammar and 
math. Most students are good learners, but there are some problems. Often there is no 
parental involvement and the students have too many siblings, too little money (living 
costs are high), and their parents have an unstable salary. For example, there’s one sixth 
grade boy whose parents are almost always absent. He takes care of his second grade 
sister (both are at this school). He’s a very good student as well.” 
 Teacher Wang’s narrative reveals an important theme: for migrant students who lack a 
nurturing home environment, migrant schools provide a range of functions that extend 
beyond a basic education.
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4. Acting as Parents, Not Just Teachers
 Precisely because of the unstable backgrounds of many migrant students just described, 
migrant schoolteachers often act as pseudo-parents to their students. Teacher Wang’s narrative is 
just one of many  that I encountered while visiting migrant  schools. While migrant school 
administrators stressed to me the potential of every student, regardless of background, they  did 
provide evidence for a higher rate of behavioral problems among migrant students. The reasons 
behind this are many, and some - such as unstable family circumstances due to migration and 
precarious finances - have been discussed in previous sections. Principal Zhang at  Bai Miao 
Middle School identified another objective of migrant schools that brought with it unique 
challenges: 
“The second problem [the first  being school safety] is maintaining or increasing 
education quality. How do you make the kids behave, love learning, become good people, 
and encourage the truly talented students to get ahead? The students don’t work that hard, 
and many don’t like learning but like playing instead. The teachers have to work to teach 
them to pay attention, focus, and have good habits. It’s a numbers problem (数据问题). 
The students have high mobility  as well; parents often have the lowest level of 
employment, and if pay  is bad or unstable, they will move and take their children with 
them.”
 Principal Zhang’s statement exemplifies the broad, all-encompassing mission I witnessed 
at many of the migrant schools I visited. Migrant teachers saw their prerogative as not just to 
impart a basic education to their students but to cultivate their habits and intellect, an outlook 
that draws certain comparisons to the American idea of citizenship  through a (liberal arts) 
education. Principal Zhang wanted his students to “love learning, become good people” in 
addition to meeting their educational requirements. To compensate for unstable home 
environments and frequent student mobility, migrant schools have adopted appropriate measures, 
such as school dormitories and teachers with expanded duties to not only teach but also to 
mentor and discipline. 
 Table 4 below lists the self-reported student mobility of each migrant school. Mobility for 
students among the schools varies from low (3% of students moving each semester) to relatively 
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high (up to 25% of students). High levels of mobility disrupt the education of migrant students 
and adds to the challenges already faced by migrant schools. 
Table 4: Student Mobility by School
School % that leave each year
Tongxin Elementary School (同心小学), Unclear
Dandelion Middle School (蒲公英中学) 
Unclear, most leave 9th grade
Little Swan (小天鹅小学) Elementary 
School
40/600 a semester (about 7%)
Blue Skies (蓝天凤元）Elementary School 30-40/1200 each semester (about 3-4%)
Future Bilingual School （未来双语学校） 100-200/800 each semester (12.5-25%)
Migrant school in Chaoyang district 70/80 out of 500 a semester (16%)
Bai Miao (白庙实验学校)Experimental 
Elementary School
100/900 a semester (11%)
Beijing East Wind Love and Hope 
Elementary School (北京⻛风华爱心希望小
学)
70/80 out of 500 a semester (16%)
Richard Cao, who was a volunteer at Dandelion Middle School during the summer of 
2012-2013, described his students thusly:
“They really need an authority figure at home, especially  in middle school. For the male 
students, when they  don’t have an authority figure they tend to become troublemakers: 
smoking, drinking. You’ll see the ninth graders smoking when they leave school. I had 
two students buy a beer while I was with them. The kids were like, “Oh whatever.” 
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I think bullying and domestic violence is also an issue and much more serious, because 
they  experience that at home. Their dads might be abusive. So if you experience domestic 
violence, you tend to do the same to your children. That really applies here.”
Bochen Han also volunteered for the summer of 2014 at Dandelion Middle School as an English 
and homeroom teacher. She told me: 
“Dandelion is more of a family than a school. They really  take care of every aspect of 
their kids’ lives. The teachers go on home visits for every single student each year. 
When were at the school in summer camp the rules were more relaxed for us, but for [the 
students] it was very restricted. They couldn’t eat any snacks. One graduate volunteer 
brought a watermelon, and the principal scolded her. I don’t know why. But us U.S. 
volunteers were freer. But the Dandelion graduate volunteers couldn’t get popsicles. One 
guy threw his away. They’re still very respectful of the school, and they listen to the 
school because of all the support and care the school gives them after graduation.”
 Dandelion is an exceptional example of the significant, almost familial, presence a 
migrant school can have within their students’ lives. However, similar actions and attitudes 
prevailed in lesser degrees at the other schools I visited. At Tongxin Elementary School in Picun, 
teachers and administrators organized regular performance and art sessions for students at the 
affiliated New Workers’ Art Troupe Theater, where the school’s cofounders used their rock music 
background to encourage self-expression and artistic sensibilities. At Beijing East Wind 
Elementary School, the principal invested 20,000 RMB of her own money to refurbish the 
school’s new, larger location. Meanwhile, teachers worked after school without pay to give 
enrichment seminars to parents while offering babysitting for younger students. At the migrant 
school in Chaoyang, volunteer teachers provided the majority  of the physical education and 
extracurricular programming. 
 Schools often struggled to fulfill expansive education objectives with their students and 
serve as teachers, administrators, friends, and mentors with limited physical, financial, and 
human resources. Migrant schools have stepped into the void but are often unable to fully satisfy 
their students’ needs. 
31
5. Educational continuity. 
 Due to the fact that each step of China’s educational system is a prerequisite for the next, 
exclusion from one stage makes pursuing higher education and later, higher-paying white-collar 
employment opportunities nearly impossible. For example, students who attend an accredited 
elementary school can enter a publicly  licensed middle school more easily. Only those who have 
graduated from public, accredited middle schools may attend public high schools that offer the 
national curriculum which prepares students for the college entrance examination (高考). 
Moreover, only  residents with local hukou can take the gaokao in Beijing which confers 
advantages; China’s best universities are in Beijing, and Beijing students receive preferential 
admission. 
Beijing education regulation also makes it so that pursuing middle school education in 
the city is much more difficult than finding elementary schooling. Elementary schooling requires 
compliance with far fewer building, health, and safety regulations as well as curriculum 
expectations.14  Dandelion Middle School is one of a handful of migrant schools that offer a 
middle school education in Beijing. “Because there are very few middle schools for migrants 
here, we decided grades 7-9 were the most needed,” a graduate coordinator at Dandelion told 
me.15 
 Meanwhile, migrant students who cannot attend public high school but wish to attend 
college must travel back to their hometowns and take the entrance exams there. As described in 
the Introduction, each province has its own college entrance examination curriculum and migrant 
students usually  return back home before high school to begin mastering that province’s gaokao 
content.  Furthermore, a migrant student’s grades may  not transfer between schools if they move, 
as migrants often do, meaning that they may have to repeat grades and may be left without a 
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14 "Interview with Liu Kun." Personal interview. 24 December 2013.
15 ibid.
physical academic record. Even if students do have a transcript, most high schools in Beijing do 
not recognize diplomas awarded by  migrant schools, and migrant school principles are 
constantly looking for Beijing and Hebei (a province bordering Beijing) high schools which will 
accept their graduating students for the next year. Most migrant students thus stop attending 
school as they  get older, preferring to either return to their home province, work, or, in the best 
case scenario, attend a vocational school in Beijing or Hebei, some of which do accept  migrant 
school degrees. There are, of course, exceptions to this pathway, though the odds are stacked 
against the migrant student at each step of the way. 
 Even vocational high schools may not be viable options for migrant children. As of this 
year, only  a handful of vocational high schools in Beijing and Hebei accept students with a 
diploma from a migrant school. Dandelion Middle School, one of the most successful and well-
established migrant schools in Beijing and the only licensed migrant middle school in Beijing, 
currently has an arrangement with a for profit, private (“民办”) high school in Beijing which will 
accept Dandelion graduates for a discounted tuition of 6,000 RMB a year. However, this one 
high school cannot absorb all Dandelion graduates, and Dandelion administrators are in annual 
negotiations with two other relatively well-ranked public high schools in Hebei who may accept 
migrant school diplomas and offer a tuition discount.16  Approximately  30-40 of Dandelion 
graduates will graduate ninth grade and test  into the two Hebei high schools. One to two top 
students attend Guo Hua, one of the top  public schools in Guangzhou province each year; 
Guangzhou, a southern province in China’s manufacturing hub, has historically been the most 
popular destination for migrant workers. A further one to two elite students have been able to 
attend United World Colleges (UWC) high schools each year 17  (UWC is a consortium of 14 
international schools with a commitment to diversity, social action, and peace). It must be 
emphasized, however, that Dandelion is the exception, rather than the norm, for migrant students 
in Beijing. 
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 By middle school, “you can just go back home to attend school at that point. When 
you’re young, you have to follow your parents, and so elementary schools are more needed,” 
according to Principal Liu at Blue Skies Elementary School in Fengtai District. This presents a 
conflicting policy model to the mission of Dandelion Middle School. Because most 
academically-minded migrant students often choose to return to their home province by high 
school-age, where they can prepare for college entrance examination,18  some school principals 
do not believe in allowing students beyond middle school age to stay in Beijing migrant schools 
(Wu & Qi 2013). In their eyes, Beijing migrant schools serve as a temporary, stop gap measure 
for migrant parents and young children who face the tough decision between leaving their 
children behind or seeking out unlicensed private schools. However, the fact remains that very 
few educational options remain for migrant students beyond elementary school.
6. Heterogeneity within Districts: Local district officials had very  different  approaches in dealing 
with migrant education. This kind of variation in how Beijing’s district governments approach 
migrant education creates a politically unstable environment in which migrant schools must eke 
out survival. Below are profiles of three separate schools that represent the spectrum of 
responses migrant schools have received from government officials and the innovative but 
diverse modes of survival migrant schools have developed in reaction to this variation. 
Lan Tian (Blue Sky) Elementary School in Fengtai District
 Lan Tian (Blue Sky) Elementary School exemplifies the handful of Beijing migrant 
schools that receive government approval and financial support. It is somewhere in between a 
private (”民办“) and public (“公办“) school. It  is neither completely public because it must 
generate part of its own revenue by charging school fees (on the low end at RMB 750 per 
semester) from its students, but it also receives significant financial help from the Fengtai 
government. The school received its first large public grant in 2005, when the Fengtai district 
government sponsored a competition, which Blue Skies School won, for which it  received RMB 
1.5 million. Since then, the Fengtai district  government has waived the school’s monthly  rent for 
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18 See the Introduction’s section “Educational Options for Migrant Children.” 
the large single-story courtyard property it  uses. Last year, the district  government also paid to 
have the principal’s office outfitted with new furniture and a computer. Blue Skies is one of the 
only migrant schools in Fengtai district  that has an approval from the Beijing Ministry of 
Education to operate. In the last few years, it  has become impossible for other migrant schools to 
receive an education permit in Fengtai district. As the principal of Blue Skies elementary school 
admitted to me, “we have a permit; it’s very easy  to get because we have government support. 
Now there are only three other migrant  schools in Fengtai that I know of. It’s very hard to get a 
permit without support now.” 19  
 As the example of Blue Skies Elementary School demonstrates, securing government 
support is crucial for running a successful migrant school. Without government support, migrant 
schools face constant fear of closure and regular financial shortfalls. However, it was unclear 
why Principal Liu at Blue Skies had been targeted and selected for special government treatment 
while many other migrant schools in Fengtai district  had been closed since the 2000s. It  is quite 
possible that factors unrelated to the school’s educational quality  were instrumental in securing 
its longevity; these factors could include any special political connections or relationships the 
principal might  have with local officials, personal wealth, or political incentives on the part of 
district officials themselves. However, this information was impossible to verify through 
interviews. 
 Blue Skies is particularly exceptional given the relatively  harsh migrant education 
policies of Fengtai district. As early as 2001, Fengtai government officials began their first wave 
of school closures; 50 schools within the district  were closed that year, leaving 10,000 migrant 
students suddenly school-less (Bequelin 2002). To this day, despite having a larger migrant 
population than districts like Daxin, Changping, and Tongzhou districts, Fengtai has fewer 
migrant schools open than each of said districts and is home to a mere 3% of Beijing’s migrant 
schools despite having 11.5% of Beijing’s migrant population. 
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 Dandelion Middle School also has a unique relationship that  borders on Lan Tian’s close 
relationship  with Fengtai district officials. Dandelion is “an extreme exception,” as Danna Liu, 
an employee of Project BEAM, a nonprofit that sponsors extracurricular activities for migrant 
children, said.20 Echoing Danna’s sentiment, Linxiu Zhang of REAP told me, “Dandelion is not 
replicable.”21  Its principal, Zheng Hong, has a murky background. As several volunteers and 
teachers told me, Principal Zheng had many political and personal connections, though the exact 
nature of these connections were never made clear because everyone was told not to talk about it 
at the very beginning of their time at Dandelion.22  Before opening Dandelion, Principal Hong 
was originally  a professor in Beijing after which she studied in the United States and received 
her degree from the Harvard Kennedy School. Today, Dandelion Middle School is the most well-
known Beijing migrant school, has numerous volunteer partnerships with universities (including 
Duke) and high schools around the world, and largely funded by private social donations from 
individuals and corporations. 
 Dandelion is moving in the 2014-2015 year, and the process by which is moving is 
indicative of the special relationship it was able to cultivate with local officials in Daxing district. 
Dandelion was notified several years in advance, which is unusual in cases of demolition and 
renovation. With the extra time, the school was able to find another plot  of land nearby in Daxing 
District and make plans to move their entire school there by  2015. The expenses for building the 
new campus - around $10 million - will be entirely  paid for by China Minsheng Investment 
Company (Fan 2014). Dandelion’s exceptional circumstances can be explained by a combination 
of factors: Principal Zheng Hong’s personal connections, the school’s tireless fundraising and 
networking efforts, and the continual high educational quality  of its curriculum. As Henry, a 
math, English, and computer teacher at Dandelion explained:
“The government is working with out school because they recognize that after nine years, 
it’s pretty good. At very beginning, they didn’t believe that  the school was not for-profit. 
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22 "Interview with Bochen Han." Personal interview. 13 September 2014.
Officials recognize now that it's a good school, so the school has more freedom and 
creative opportunity.”23 
 As the examples of Blue Skies Elementary School and Dandelion Middle School 
demonstrate, personal relationships and rare cases of luck and good fortune often determine how 
successfully  schools are able to navigate the capricious policy landscape of Beijing’s education 
system. Unfortunately, no generalizable methods for securing stability  and protection from 
government policies exist. In operating outside the public legal and financial framework of the 
education system, migrant schools must rely on their own wits to survive and flourish. 
Xiao Tian’E Elementary School, Changping District 
 Xiao Tian’E (Little Swan) Elementary  School in Changping Disrict occupies a legal and 
political space one step down from Blue Skies Elementary School. Little Swan is run by 
Principal Yan, a crusty and forthright man well respected by his colleagues. Like Dandelion 
Middle School though to a lesser degree, Little Swan has achieved local recognition and 
supplemented its course offerings by hosting a stream of Chinese volunteers from local 
universities and multinational corporations with branches in Beijing, such as Goldman Sachs. 
However, Little Swan receives no support from the local government outside of safety 
inspections, and its facilities remain dustier, smaller, and more run-down than Dandelion’s. All 
my interviews were done in the outside courtyard because there was no spare space in the 
classrooms. Upon arriving at school, which was hidden away off a dirt road next to a large 
scientific-industrial park, my taxi driver remarked dismissively, “What a shabby looking private 
school!”
 Unlike Blue Skies Elementary  School, Little Swan Elementary School has encountered 
government hostility towards his school. Despite a previous attempt to do so, Principal Yan has 
not received official permission to run his school, and the migrant children who attend are not 
required to present xueji, though they  also remain outside of the legal education system by 
attending an unlicensed school.  As Principal Yan stated:
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“This particular school has no permit. I looked into the process and decided not to do it 
and to focus more on education. I’m not too sure what the details of the process is like, 
but it was too difficult, even from some basic investigation. It was one permit followed 
after by another (每证接每证)”
 Little Swan received no monetary  or political support from local officials. Moreover, 
because of his school’s unlicensed status, Principal Yan was wary  of discussing his school’s legal 
status and the xueji status of his students. Unlicensed schools are technically  illegal, and 
remaining open requires sensitivity and prudence when dealing with local officials. Principal 
Yan’s response to my questions about his students’ xueji status and how the school had dealt with 
this problem is recorded below:
“There are some things that just shouldn’t be discussed. There are no permits needed to 
attend this school, and there are very few other schools nearby. I don’t  pay attention to 
the others [other migrant schools]. The government has never bothered me; the 
government doesn’t really care about  my school. I don’t have an explanation for why. 
Perhaps it’s because we both have shared interests, which is educating these kids...I won’t 
participate in this report24 because it has too much policy  aspects, and I just don’t talk 
about policy. We do what we can do. Other than teaching, we don’t do anything else.” 
 His evasive nature and obvious discomfort with talking about politics in relation to his 
migrant school were striking; no other principal I encountered vehemently refused to discuss 
their political situation. Despite further questioning, the principal did not yield more information 
about his school’s situation and why he was hesitant to broach the subject. Such denial and 
feigned ignorance of local politics may be a survival strategy. By  intentionally  disengaging in 
politics and emphasizing the “shared interests” both migrant schools and the local government 
have in providing a good education for migrant children, migrant school principals like Principal 
Yan may be able to avoid controversy and keep their schools open. 
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information for an additional research report that Xingongmin Jihua (New Citizens’ Project) was writing at the time 
on migrant education in China. The report which Principal Yan refers to is the New Citizens’ Project report, which 
you can download here in Mandarin: http://pan.baidu.com/s/1pJ4Ynof I have made this comment before, but omit 
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 Such an approach and distrustful attitude is a stark contrast with the open and welcoming 
attitude of migrant schools like Blue Skies and Dandelion Middle School. The latter two 
continue to actively court government bodies and in turn receive monetary and political support 
from officials who have secured schools tangible benefits (new furniture, basketball hoops) to 
intangible benefits (political protection). 
 
Tongxin Elementary School, Chaoyang District 
 Tongxin (“With One Heart”) Elementary  School in Picun (“Skin Village”) is a rare 
example of perseverance in the midst of the increasingly common occurrence of school closures. 
Whereas Little Swan Elementary School has kept its head down and avoided attracting the public 
eye for its educational activities, Tongxin is notable for its ability to marshal social media and 
social interest groups to maintain school operations.
 Like Little Swan, Tongxin does not have a government education license to operate and 
its students thus do not need to receive, nor can they receive, a xueji in the Beijing public school 
system. The school sits in the middle of the well-established migrant  settlement of Picun, which 
houses many of the workers who work in the nearby furniture manufacturers and carpentry 
warehouses. Picun also happens to be the headquarters for the New Workers’ Art Troupe (hereby 
‘the Troupe’), a nonprofit and social enterprise founded and run by  a rock band of the same 
moniker (新工人艺术团). The Troupe founded and help run the Tongxin Elementary School, as 
well as provide music and theater lessons and performance opportunities for Picun migrant 
workers and students. The Troupe has been able to create a platform for migrant workers in the 
arts and in advocating for great labor rights. Uniquely, Tongxin Elementary School is thus not 
only an educational venture but instead is a rare example of civil society formation through 
community organizing. 
 After seven years of operation, Tongxin was told in June 2011 by  the local authorities of 
Jinzhan Township  (where Tongxin is located) that the school would have to be closed. The notice 
cited safety violations, noting that the school had not secured the proper licenses to operate, a 
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common reason local governments use in closures of migrant schools. Tongxin’s experienced 
mirrored what other migrant school administrators told me. As Principal Tian of the Future 
Bilingual School narrated: 
“Beijing treats these schools [migrant schools] with a very  defeatist, accepting policy. 
They  tolerate their presence and let  them exist because they recognize people need to go 
to school and will examine [migrant schools] on basic codes of safety, health, education, 
but will give no financial assistance. The schools also would not pass the permit 
process... Before it  was easy  to establish a private school, especially in the 1990s. From 
2000-2004 they would let you [start a private school]. Now people are not allowed to 
start a new one. Only those remaining are tolerated but are being squeezed out. Other 
schools in our area have been closed.” 
 Two months later, bulldozers moved in and cut the water lines in front of the school, 
triggering angry reactions from parents. Over the course of the next few weeks, petitions were 
signed by hundreds of protesting parents and were shared by members of the Beijing artists and 
music communities. News coverage of the school abounded in Chinese and English-language 
media. Water access was quickly restored. After negotiations with Jinzhan officials, officials 
agreed to let  the school remain open, and Tongxin opened just in time for that fall semester. 
Three other schools in Jinzhan in township  were not able to muster the kind of resistance that 
Jinzhan was able to and were closed in summer of 2011.25 
 Unlike Dandelion and Blue Skies, Tongxin has regularly confronted hostility from local 
officials and has been unable to receive an educational license despite multiple attempts. Yet 
rather than keep  a low profile to detract political attention, Tongxin’s rock musician founders 
directly  engaged the public eye to keep their school open. Tongxin’s novel position as an emblem 
of not only education equality but also of labor rights and the promotion of an alternative arts 
scene allowed it to draw on diverse interest groups to lobby on its behalf. In Tongxin’s case, it 
was not the proof of educational excellence or the shared goal of migrant education that 
ameliorated relationships between the school and local township officials, but rather the threat 
that Tongxin had become too publicly visible to be shut down. 
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Demolition, Relocation, and Urbanization 
 Although not cited explicitly by  migrant school principals, the constant threat of 
demolition and relocation (“拆迁”) in the context of urbanization emerged as a significant 
challenge. Local governments, incentivized by  the profits gained by appropriating rural land and 
selling to real estate developers at a much higher price, have been developing rural and old areas 
rapidly, often marking old properties destined for bulldozing with a large, red “拆” (demolish) 
character. A combination of economic incentives, policy goals, and a political system that still 
relies on centrally planned policy has fueled the widespread demolition of entire villages to make 
way for urban skyscrapers and high rises.26  Former residents are relocated to new, urban 
apartments or left to wait for new complexes to be built.
 Migrant schools have long been a target  for urbanization and demolition campaigns. They 
serve as physical reminders of the Chinese government’s failure to comply  with their own 
constitutional guarantee of free “compulsory education.” Local residents often complain that 
migrant schools provide shoddy education, are unsafe, and attract more migrants. Moreover, 
migrant schools occupy valuable real estate within Beijing and thus have been pushed farther and 
farther out to the edges of suburban Beijing. The majority of active migrant schools in Beijing 
today are outside of the Fifth Ring Road, which marks the edge of urban Beijing. 
 
 No official, written out policy exists regarding demolition of migrant villages and schools 
and no authoritative history of migrant settlement demolition exists. Rather, according to the 
interviews gathered for this study, officials seem to act in a policy  black box, with no discernible 
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patterns or trends. Each of the migrant school principals I spoke to expressed a lack of 
knowledge about demolition and an acceptance of the ubiquitous uncertainty they all faced. 
 For example, Chaoyang Migrant School has managed to stay  open in their current 
location since 2005, even while neighboring migrant schools have been closed. When asked 
about how he had stayed open while his peers had been closed down, the principal shrugged his 
shoulders: “There have been lots of schools demolished in the last few years. I don’t know why 
this one has survived. It’s not clear to me.”27 
 Yet a common form of resistance to the seemingly  arbitrary spate of migrant school 
closures also emerged in interviews with migrant school administrators and teachers. By 
cultivating relationships with government officials and leveraging media publicity, select migrant 
schools have successfully warded off closure attempts. As Zhang Donghui, a professor at 
Beijing’s Renmin University, observed, “Sometimes if the school has connections with officials 
or someone famous, they are supported or get donations from the. The school gets a reputation 
from the publicity and it  can survive because the government would feel bad if they shut it 
down.”28  Dandelion Middle School and Tongxin Middle School are notable examples of this 
strategy among the school sample in this thesis. However, the scarcity of these occurrences 
suggests that these success stories are the exception and not the norm. 
No Longer A Hot Topic
 Despite the challenges they face, migrant schools no longer command the media and 
academic attention they  once did. Migrant education - and the issue of migrant workers as a 
whole - continues to operate at the subaltern level on a massive scale; nearly  1 in 2 students in 
Beijing is a migrant student. Yet many academics and policymakers regard migrant education as 
a social problem that has been dealt with effectively or will soon disappear of its own accord.
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 Professor Zhang Donghui has done research on public and private schools in China in the 
past and has more recently focused her research on migrant  education experiences in Beijing. 
When I talked with her, she had just finished a one yearlong observational study of a migrant 
school. She described her experience researching migrant children: 
“The topic of migrant education has been around for a while. When migrant children 
couldn’t get into any  public schools, there was a lot of debate about the topic. The general 
consensus now is that the government has done what it  could, which is to allow them to 
attend public school [under certain procedures]. In 2003, there was a policy allowing 
migrant children in public schools with proper paperwork. The policy was not really 
implemented until 2006 because the schools could still charge school fees, which were 
banned in 2006.29  Now they  have begun the “five certificate” policy. The topic is no 
longer ‘hot’” (“热，红”).30 
 This, in combination with efforts among Beijing’s peer cities around the country, has 
diminished the public perception that migrant education is a pressing social issue in need of 
immediate attention. 
 It is unclear going forward what attention the question of migrant education will garner in 
the Chinese government. Beijing’s population continues to grow. At the end of 2013, as many  as 
38% of those living in Beijing did not have Beijing urban hukou but had registered with the 
Beijing government (“Beijing’s Population Exceeds 21 million”). Another estimated 10 million 
workers remain unregistered but reside in the larger Beijing metropolitan area (Crothall 2014). 
Thus, the immense social cost of urban exclusion will not disappear of its own accord but rather, 
will appear in many  guises in the upcoming decade irrespective of how Beijing decides to 
approach migrant education. 
 For the most part, migrant education educators and parents are ambivalent about their 
prospects. Rather than react with anger or sadness to the prospect of losing students to the “five 
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certificate” policy, the threat  of closure, or worse, sudden demolition, the administrators and 
teachers had learned a weary resignation to take things “step by  step,” or, “a step is a step.” (走
一步就算一步”)  Many had previously taught at schools that no longer existed due to 
demolition. Principal Tian, of the Bai Miao Middle School exemplified this fatalist acceptance of 
precariousness: “What are you going to do? It’s hard to predict whether my own school will 
survive. It’s probably good for the next five years at least. If the government demolishes it, I 
don’t know when they will tell you in advance anyways.”3132 
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32 While interviewing the principals of several migrant schools, I was taken aback at the unexpected variation in how 
they perceived the operations of their respective schools and the state of migrant education. On one hand were the 
principals who operated their schools at great personal expense and believed in the institution. On the other hand 
were the principals who felt that migrant education was a mediocre and temporary solution to the hukou problem. In 
their eyes, due to safety, health, and teacher regulations which prevented them from receiving an official permit to 
operate and the common dearth of financial and political resources, migrant schools were low in quality and should 
not persist as a longterm bandaid for migrant students in search of an education. The remarks of the principal at 
Hong Qi Elementary School are indicative of the latter view: 
“This issue will pass. You don’t need to study this. In big cities, [migrant education] won’t exist anymore. 
It’s not a thing that will stay. Migrants don’t want to go to cities, to come here, where the educational 
quality is this bad. These schools shouldn’t exist. Students should not go to migrant schools but should go 
to better schools like public schools. I predict that the government will continue to pay more attention to 
migrant schools and cities and cities will provide more investment and resources into this topic. Our school 
is very bad, and we hope [the students] will go to better schools. Now, there are not that many migrant 
schools, but that is a good thing. If they all go to these schools, where will they end up in life?”  
The principal at The One Hundred Years (百年) Vocational School (BNVS) in Beijing shared similar views with the 
principal of Hong Qi: 
“I don’t think migrant education is a problem anymore; rather, it is just a transition problem as China 
transitions to a more modern society. Since 2008, [migrant education] hasn’t been in the news as much, and 
and there hasn’t been any real new news on migrant education, because it's not a problem anymore. The 
government should raze the migrant schools because the government should be taking responsibility for 
education. Anyways, migrants can go to a public school for free now. The only way I see a problem is if 
they would not go if the school was too far and there was no bus to take them.”15 
 These viewpoints reflect an ongoing debate in the literature and Chinese policymaking circles about how to 
approach the topic of education for migrant students. Should they continue to close them down in the name of safety 
and upholding educational standards, or should cities legalize migrant schools and improve them? Relatedly, will 
such methods stabilize or further increase the numbers of migrant workers who move to Beijing? It was quite 
shocking to hear the principal of a migrant school himself baldly state that “these schools shouldn’t exist.” 
 This theme of demystifying the seemingly altruistic, do-good reputation that migrant schools emerged in 
the course of my research. Migrant schools are portrayed in English and sympathetic Chinese media (when they are 
featured at all) as victims of an insensitive and heavy-handed Chinese government. Migrant schools attract many 
Western and Chinese volunteers who are drawn by their social entrepreneurial quality. Migrants themselves are 
shown as helpless and uniformly destitute. Moreover, no migrant school is an altruistic social enterprise, but they are 
instead governed by a matrix of interests and incentives ranging from the economic to the personal. Still, the 
problem remains: tens of thousands of migrant students in Beijing have been left outside the public education 
system. What is the future of migrant education in China, and given the local effects of the “Five Certificate Policy” 
in Beijing, what can China do to address this national problem?
Chapter 4: The Five Certificate Policy
 
Chapter Summary
 This chapter introduces the Five Certificate Policy and describes the system’s 
requirements. I reveal that the Policy is heterogeneously  and inconsistently implemented within 
Beijing, mirroring the similarly heterogeneous attitudes local government officials have towards 
migrant schools. Using a mixture of visual data and qualitative data from interviews with 
migrant parents and migrant school administrators, I assess the intentional and unintentional 
consequences of the Five Certificate Policy on the migrant education system and its current 
challenges in Beijing. 
The “Five Certificate” System and the Xueji policy
 In 2013, in an effort to standardize the school enrollment and permit  (学籍）process 
between China’s many  provinces and cities and improve educational management, the Chinese 
government created an electronic educational xueji (学籍) system (“Migrant Schools Appeal on 
Beijing”). This policy  change was intended to create a universal system for registering all 
students of compulsory  education age and would be updated annually so as to provide a census 
for more efficiently allocating educational resources (“Beijing Migrant Schools Cannot Obtain 
School Permits”). The electronic system is called “一人一生一号” (“one person, one life, one 
number”) but contrary to its title, the system has been reinterpreted in Beijing to effectively  shut 
out students who wish to attend school in cities and provinces other than where their hukou is 
registered. Because the hukou still serves as the basic unit  of Chinese documentation and 
certification, students are encouraged to apply for a xueji number linked to a local school where 
they have hukou. 
 For migrant students who do not have local, urban hukou, completing a complex set  of 
five certificates is necessary to receive a Beijing xueji school enrollment number and attend a 
public school. This set of five certificates was mandated by a September 2013 Beijing policy 
called the Five Certificate Policy. One migrant school principal estimated that to obtain the five 
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certificates, one needed to meet an additional 17 requirements.33  No other Chinese city had 
requirements similar to Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy in the course of this research. 
Unfortunately, the Five Certificate System is reflective of the inefficiency of Chinese 
bureaucracy. On the whole, China’s government remains overwhelmingly paperwork-driven, and 
Chinese citizens must obtain an average of 103 crucial pieces of official documentation in their 
lifetime (Wee 2014). The five certificates migrant students must obtain to enter a public school 
are listed in Table 5 below.
Table 5: Five Certificate Requirements
Certificate Name How to obtain the permit
Proof of Housing 1. The migrant must present their housing ownership certificates or 
purchase contract and a copy of the original housing construction sector 
registered (if they own property). 
2. If they rent, the migrant must present proof rental housing, a 
standardized and effective house has a lease contract, the original owner 
real estate license, their ID card and a copy of the property owner’s ID. 
3. Those living in public housing rental units should provide proof of 
housing authority approval. Renting an office space or a basement do 
not count. 
Proof of 
Employment (务⼯工
就业证)
1. The migrant should provide original labor contract and a copy and 
their employment status with employer may be audited.
2. The migrant must provide the original business permit where they are 
working and a copy.
3. If they have a legal representative, the applicant’s legal representative 
should provide an original and copy of firm’s legal permit.
4. If they are a shareholder, they must provide their or their partners’ 
industrial or commercial permits and records.
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Certificate Name How to obtain the permit
Family hukou (全
家户口簿)
1. The ages of children and adolescents in the hukou booklet and birth 
certificate booklet on age should be consistent. 
2. If the child is over age and not in school, they should go to their local 
subdistrict office to prove their area of domicile or township people's 
government or county government department of education, and 
explain the reasons for failure to admission to a school. 
3. When at the office, provide the "non-city residence-age children Fact 
Sheet,” while providing relevant evidence, such as hospital records or 
kindergarten proof. 
4. Children should provide proof of domicile issued by the health 
department or social compensation fee proof.
Temporary living 
permit in Beijing 
(在京暂住证)
1. Both parents must hold temporary residence issued by the local police 
station and the temporary residence permit.
2. The temporary residence permit in Beijing and the actual residence 
address and proof of residence must be consistent. 
3. A temporary residence permit information must be printed; any 
altered renders it invalid.
Hukou in the 
absence of 
guardianship (户籍
所在地没有监护条
件的证明)
1, residing street, township government issued proof of the original 
(with official seal). 
2, this proves the use of standardized text printed by our region. 
3, parents' names, the names and other information-age children and 
booklet consistent. "
! As this table shows, there are many individual pieces of paperwork a migrant worker 
must compile to apply for each of the Five Certificates. For example, just to receive the first 
Proof of Housing certificate, a migrant worker must qualify  for five supporting pieces of 
paperwork. 
 Table 6 records the eight migrant schools I visited and their experience with the 
electronic xueji system instituted winter 2013-2014. Overwhelmingly, the vast majority of the 
schools I visited reported having severe problems coping with the new electronic xueji system 
and virtually none had students who had obtained a xueji in the national system, either in their 
home province or in Beijing.  
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Table 6: School License and Xueji status by School
School Licensed? Students with Xueji Incoming Students with 
Xueji 
Hong Qi Elementary 
School 
No None None
Bai Miao Experimental 
Elementary and Middle 
School
No Unclear None
Future Bilingual 
Elementary School
No A handful; only “a 
few”
None
Lan Tian (Blue Sky) 
Elementary School
Yes 160 Unclear
Dandelion Middle 
School
Yes Unclear Unclear 
Xiao Tian’E 
Elementary School
No Refused to answer Refused to answer
Haidian School No None None
Tongxin Elementary 
School
No None None
           As can be seen in the table, none of the schools had their circumstances regarding xueji for 
the upcoming 2014-2015 school year sorted out or refused to answer.  
 Regardless of the underlying motivations for such a change, 2013-2014 marked a turning 
point in the development of migrant education in Beijing. The events of the last year have further 
destabilized the informal institutions of migrant education, leading one longstanding migrant 
schoolteacher to dourly conclude, “this is the most chaotic (“乱”) year so far.”34 
Heterogeneity in Policy Implementation
 
During research in Beijing from December 2013 - January 2014 and May 2014 - June 
2014, I found a splintering in policy implementation among Beijing’s 14 districts. Although all 
48
34 "Interview with Teacher Cao." Personal interview. 16 May 2014.
districts had policies that  were overall unfavorable for migrant education, the degree to which 
such policies were implemented varied by district and even sometimes by local official. 
 A picture of “five certificate” application instructions in Daxing district.
 Since Beijing has begun cracking down on migrant education, regulation towards migrant 
schools has splintered at the district level, so that support and openness towards migrant schools 
varies from district to district. Examining the Five Certificate Policy process for obtaining a 
school enrollment number under the new electronic xueji system reveals the opaqueness and 
heterogeneous implementation of a system that purports to introduce a measure of 
standardization. Moreover, because no other city  other than Beijing has chosen to implement the 
national electronic xueji system as such, I surmise that Beijing has used the Five Certificate 
Policy  as a tool to turn migrants away from Beijing and keep  migrant students out of their 
education system.  
 Often, hairsplitting distinctions in paperwork requirements differentiated the districts’ 
interpretation of the national xueji system. Each “certificate” requires a corresponding set  of 
paper trail of proof before being awarded. While the five certificates themselves remain 
consistent from district  to district, it is these more specific items needed to obtain each certificate 
that experience significant  variation. Below is a critical examination of the variation in the 
requirements of just one of the certificates, the Proof of Employment. For a detailed analysis of 
the remaining certificates, please see Appendix 3. 
Proof of Employment
The certificate for Proof of Employment requires the following additional paperwork:
1. The migrant should provide their original labor contract and a copy. Their employment status 
with their employer may be audited in the application process. 
2. The migrant must provide the original business permit where they are working and a copy.
49
3. If they have a legal representative, the applicant’s legal representative should provide the 
original copy and a printed copy of firm’s legal permit.
4. If they are a shareholder, they must provide their or their partners’ industrial or commercial 
permits and records. 
 On top of these basic requirements, each district  has added its own specific requirements. 
In Dongcheng and Chaoyang Districts, both the migrant  mother and father must each provide a 
separate set of all the required paperwork. Normally, only the father would need to apply for 
proof of employment to complete this step for qualifying for their child’s xueji. 
 Other districts have stipulations about how long the migrant worker must have been 
working under contract. In Changping district, a migrant-heavy district, the start date on the 
labor contract must have begun at least  six months ago at  the time of application. In the spirit of 
Yizhuang Town, Daxing requires that migrants must have worked for at least three years in 
Daxing district to apply for Proof of Employment, just as they require three years residency  to 
apply for Proof of Residency. 
 Some districts offer migrants an option when providing their original labor contract. In 
Haidian and Xicheng, migrants working for a danwei, or official work unit (单位) can provide a 
proof of employment issued by their work unit in lieu of a work contract. Dongcheng district, 
which houses very few migrant  workers, requires the original labor contract and a copy as well 
as a proof of employment statement from any migrant worker employed by a danwei.  In 
Xicheng and Haidian districts, migrant workers employed by a danwei must  also provide, in 
addition to their labor contract or proof of employment issued by their danwei, an officially copy 
of said danwei’s legal code or business license with an official stamp. 
 Several districts also require continuous contribution to the city-wide social insurance 
scheme to qualify as an officially registered employee. In Xicheng, Tongzhou, Daxing, and 
Changping districts, migrant workers must set aside a portion of their monthly income for a 
public social insurance fund (社保) and provide documentation of their contribution to receive 
the Proof of Employment certificate. However, as described in Chapter 1, many migrant parents 
do not know that they must set aside part of their monthly income for the social insurance 
scheme to obtain an employment certificate and instead pocket the money  with each paycheck. 
Moreover, the duration of contribution to a social insurance fund varies from district to district. 
Xicheng and Daxin only require three months of continuous contribution, Changping requires 
four years, and Tongzhou requires a full year of continuous contribution. 
 Recognizing that a good number of migrant workers are engaged in small business and 
informal sectors such as food vending, street side stores, repair stalls, and vegetable markets, a 
handful of districts require migrant employed in such professions to give proof that  their street 
stall is officially registered. Dongcheng, Xicheng, and Haidian districts all require migrant 
workers that earn income from street  stalls to provide the original copy and a printed copy  of 
their stall license or permission for the market they  work at authorizing their stall’s presence. In 
reality, virtually all of these stalls and vendors are unregistered; instances of food vendors 
hurriedly fleeing the premises when local security officers show up and relatedly, bribing 
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security officers are common. In Daxing district, self-employed migrants must show proof of a 
business license that has been valid for at least three years measured from April 2011.  
 Finally, three districts require documents specific to that district. In other words, a 
migrant worker cannot move from district to district within Beijing, but must live and work in 
the same district continuously  for a certain period of time to receive certificates from that district. 
In Fengtai district, where in 2001 officials forcibly closed down 50 migrant schools, migrants 
must provide need residency and employment permits specific to Fengtai. Migrants can only 
receive certificates from Fengtai if they have worked and rented continuously for one year in 
Fengtai district. Daxin has a three-year minimum for business certificates specific to Daxin. 
Similarly, Tongzhou requires migrants to be able to prove their employment in Tongzhou 
beginning in December 2013 or before. This effectively  requires migrants to have worked in 
Tongzhou for at least a year in jobs that have paper documentation before they can apply  for a 
Proof of Employment certificate. 
“Stopped Up” in the Permit Process
 As the description to just one of the requirements of Five Certificate shows, Beijing’s 
districts have considerable influence in the regulation of migrant education in Beijing. They have 
some autonomy in determining who is able to enter Beijing’s public schools through the Five 
Certificate system. The Five Certificate requirements are complex and thus daunting.  
 Because the paperwork and permits are often similar for each of the Five Certificates 
between districts, an inability to secure one certificate often means that migrant parents will not 
be able to secure other certificates. This is what Zhen, the migrant mother from Bai Miao Middle 
School from Chapter 1, meant when she described how her attempts to register her son at a local 
public school had been “stopped up,” because, as she explained, “if you can’t get  a temporary 
resident permit, then you can’t get the other permits.”35
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35 "Interview with Zhen." Personal interview. 15 May 2014.
Exacerbating Challenges
 I argue that Beijing’s Five Certificate Policy has only  exacerbated the challenges that 
migrant schools already faced in their daily operations. Of the challenges I identified in the first 
part of my research, the Five Certificate Policy has magnified the problems of educational 
continuity  and resource scarcity. On balance, the Five Certificate Policy has made it more 
difficult for migrants to access education in Beijing and further legitimized the exclusion of 
migrant students from the public education system. 
A Lack of Continuity in Educational Pathways
 Educational continuity reflects structural inequalities within the education system that 
disadvantage migrant students. The xueji and Five Certificate Policy has only worsened the 
problem of educational continuity  by raising an additional obstacle for accessing education in 
Beijing. As a result of the electronic xueji and Five Certificate Policies, approximately 50,000 - 
70,000 migrant students attend school outside of the public educational system and are 
effectively shut out of the rigidly linked Chinese educational pathways.36 Nearly 50,000- 70,000 
migrant students have not been able to attain the Five Certificates since the policy’s 
implementation but still remain in Beijing. These students are thus excluded from pursuing and 
are effectively  invisible within the electronic public education system. Without a xueji, these 
students have no academic record and cannot take the national high school and college entrance 
examinations, thus cutting off any opportunity for higher education.
Legitimizing marginalization 
 Most of all, the Five Certificate Policy further edifies the social, political, and now legal 
marginalization of migrant schools. Previous to the Five Certificate Policy, migrant schools 
without an educational license operated in a legal grey space; they  could not give out degrees 
recognized by public education institutions, but for the most part, as long as they complied with 
health and safety  codes and cultivated relationships with local officials, they were allowed to 
remain. Now, without being able comply with both the national xueji policy  or the Beijing Five 
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36 "Interview with Wei Jiayu." Personal interview. 20 May 2014.
Certificate Policy, migrant schools are further excluded from the public education system and 
this exclusion legally demarcated by citywide policy. 
Unable to provide an electronic xueji for their students, migrant  schools are even more 
unattractive places for migrant parents to send their children. Already  struggling financially and 
fighting to retain teachers, migrant schools thus face an additional challenge with the Five 
Certificate Policy. The future consequences of such a policy are hard to predict. Parents may 
elect to keep their children in their hometowns while they  migrate in search of work, or they may 
choose not to migrant to Beijing altogether; more migrant parents might even choose to send 
their children to Beijing migrant schools, despite their disadvantages. 
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The entrance to Dandelion Middle School in Daxing District
Chapter 5: The Migrant Experience
Chapter Summary
This chapter reflects on how the challenges faced by migrant schools and exacerbated by 
the Five Certificate and xueji policies have affected the individual experience of migrants in 
Beijing and what these narratives can tell us about the policies’ intentions. 
Zhen’s Story
 Theoretically, Beijing migrant students can obtain the five certificates and receive a 
Beijing xueji school enrollment number even if they  do not possess Beijing hukou. However, the 
process suffers from misinformation among migrant communities and inconsistent 
implementation at the ground level. The story of a migrant mother, Zhen, who works part time as 
a social worker at a women’s rural organization in the Baimiao (白描) village in Beijing is a 
good example of the uncertainty migrants face in securing education for their children.
“My son went to Bai Miao Experimental School [the nearby  migrant school] without 
problems, with no expectations for what would happen after graduation, academically. 
School fees are 1500 RMB a semester, with additional fees for food and material 
expenses. This is cheap, as far as school fees go. My son started there at age 5, a year 
ago. He went to preschool in Hubei province [where Zhen and her husband are from]. 
However, teacher mobility was high there, and the children (students) thought it wasn’t 
well managed (“乱”). I tried to find another school and went to a public school to 
register, but the line was incredibly  long, and I waited all afternoon, only to be told that I 
didn’t have the right paperwork and permits. Apparently I needed to find a housing 
contact and work contract to register to the school. 
However, I kept trying, though I wouldn’t go to other [public] schools to try because once 
you register your name [at one school] you cannot register at the other schools. The 
impression I got was that the schools are just leading you on. 
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Finally, I gave up  hope (“每希望了”）and sent him home again. The principal [at the 
Beijing public school] straight out told me to send the son home because the nearby 
private (“ 民办”) school37 already had too many people. 
It was here that my permits were all stopped up, because if you can’t get a temporary 
resident permit, then you can’t get the other permits. And you have to keep going back 
every  so often, the office is far from where we live, and we don’t enough time with our 
jobs. 
Another problem is that I don’t know if I can get my  son’s grades transferred from his 
Hubei school back to Beijing schools, or vice versa. I also doesn’t know whether to 
register now [for a school enrollment number (学籍)], because it’s the middle of the 
semester, so I can’t  enroll [in a Beijing school], but perhaps if I wait the Hubei school 
will fill up too. I don’t have any connections or know any people in the school, so there is 
no possibility of entering a public school.”38
 Several themes emerge in the story  of Zhen’s attempts to register her young son in a 
Beijing school. The first is the extraordinarily extensive efforts she underwent in her attempts, 
without success, to register her son for school. The “five certificates” that migrants can, in 
theory, apply for to obtain a Beijing school enrollment number require a host of supporting 
documents and a deep investment of time and perseverance. Second, most migrants lack 
complete information about  the certificate requirements and annual policy changes; Zhen, for 
example, waited all day in line before being told didn’t have the correct documents, leading her 
to conclude pessimistically  that Beijing school officials were only “leading [her] on.” Other 
items needed for acquiring the correct documentation are beyond the average migrant worker’s 
scope of knowledge. For example, as an employee at Dandelion Middle School in Beijing’s 
southern Daxing district  told me: “To show proof of three years resident for attending college or 
high school, you can pay monthly  into a public social insurance scheme, but parents often won’t 
do that to save the money instead. They don’t know that their danwei [their work unit] will give 
them 100 RMB back and save the other RMB they would have put into social security. Our 
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37  “Private” or “民办“  schools can refer to more upscale schools catering towards wealthy migrants or urban 
residents,  but it also is the name given to quasi-illegal migrant schools. It was implied in Zhen’s story that the 
private school she was referred to by the Beijing principal was a migrant school.
38 "Interview with Zhen." Personal interview. 15 May 2014.
school has been encouraging [the parents] to do otherwise.”39  Of course, having a danwei and 
having access to social security  schemes are applicable only  to those with jobs in the formal 
sector, whereas the majority of migrant  workers in Beijing work in the informal sector 
(Démurger 2009). 
  Moreover, Zhen’s story also touches upon the provincial ambiguities and inconsistencies 
in implementing the policy. She is unsure about whether to apply  for school enrollment in her 
native Hubei province because doing so would automatically exclude her from using her son’s 
school enrollment number in Beijing. Yet despite having her hukou in Hubei province, it was not 
yet school enrollment time in May when I interviewed Zhen, and she was not sure whether she 
could succeed in putting her son in school in Hubei either. Finally, Zhen hints that those with 
material or personal connections and resources can talk their way or bribe their way into the 
system. Because she doesn’t “have any  connections or know any people in the school...there is 
no possibility  of entering a public school.” The rules are only strictly  applied to those who have 
nothing to give.  
 Zhen’s precariousness is consistent with other claims I heard about the unevenness of the 
electronic xueji implementation. Some local officials claim that a child who has not been living 
and going to school in their native location for the last few years cannot apply for a xueji because 
they  have spent too much time away. Principal Tian of the Future Bilingual Elementary School 
described several students of hers who had gone back to their home provinces to obtain a xueji 
and then attempt to have it transferred to Beijing; the students were denied their xueji because 
they  had been living outside of their home province since the first grade.40  Teacher Li, an 
employee and migrant parent from Shandong province who had enrolled her daughter in the 
Future Bilingual Elementary  School, ran into the same problem. She described her dilemma to 
me in a state of great agitation while wringing her hands: 
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39 "Interview with Wang Yiyan." Personal interview. 24 December 2013.
40 "Interview with Principal Tian." Personal interview. 4 June 2014.
“Shandong xueji is still very difficult to get, especially  when I’m all the way in Beijing. 
The problem is I can only get a first  grade xueji for my daughter, but she is already  in the 
third grade. So [if we went back to Shandong] she would be repeating all those years. Her 
dad is home [in Shandong] right now, and so he will ask in person soon, but the whole 
system is very unclear. It is a great source of stress for me.”41 
 This particular teacher had not  even tried applying for a Beijing xueji, deeming it 
impossible from the very start.  Teacher Li’s unresolved concerns reflect the lack of clarity about 
the xueji system and the inefficiency of such a massive national bureaucracy. In Teacher Li’s 
case, not enough third grade level spots were open in her hometown, and so the best she could 
receive was a first  grade level xueji for her daughter in Shandong. In the name of improving 
management efficiency and resource allocation in China’s vast public education system, the xueji 
system has excluded students from the system itself. 
 Wei Jiayu, a researcher with the Beijing nongovernmental organization New Citizens’ 
Project told me, “they’re not supposed to, but some local officials are just stupid. They say you 
can’t apply for a local school enrollment number even if you have local hukou, but they  haven’t 
read the actual policy notices (“政策通知”). They’re wrong.” Again, Wei Jiayu’s statements 
reflect the fact that  implementation is more muddled and heterogeneous than the original intent 
of the electronic standardization of the policy. The result is that migrant school administrators are 
unclear about their next steps but must continue enrolling students for the next  year to remain 
financially afloat.   
 “We’re not even clear what is going on,” said Principal Tian of the Hong Qi Elementary 
School. “With the xueji, it  is a six permit system. We [Hong Qi Elementary School] do not have a 
permit meaning that no students can get xueji.42 It’s not clear why they just began becoming this 
strict, but what will happen to the kids?”43
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41 "Interview with Teacher Li." Personal interview. 4 June 2014.
42 Xueji, or school enrollment numbers, are only applicable if you are attending a licensed, public school. 
43 "Interview with Principal Tian." Personal interview. 4 June 2014.
 Understanding the electronic school enrollment xueji system and ensuring that all migrant 
students are included in some way in school records has been and will continue to be a top 
source of instability and stress for migrant students. Indeed, Lan Tian Elementary  School hired a 
full time employee to help parents navigate the online xueji system in Beijing and back in their 
hometowns so as to ensure each student had a school to attend from year to year. Longterm 
planning is nearly impossible given the ambiguity surrounding the electronic system, and 
migrant children are haphazardly shuttled back and forth between where their parents work and 
their hometown, depending on the education policies are for that year. For migrant school 
administrators and teachers, for whom uncertainty about the future hinders much of their efforts 
to spearhead longterm plans, the electronic xueji system has significantly added to the ambiguity 
they navigate each day. 
 Principal Zhang of Bai Miao Experimental Elementary  and Middle School had a more 
cynical take on the national standardization of the school enrollment number. Rather than trying 
to more uniformly assess and administer the compulsory education system, he surmised that “the 
policy’s purpose is to control the migrant population. Beijing has a big part in controlling 
migrant school policy and migrant numbers.”44  The vast majority of the students currently 
attending his school do not have a xueji school enrollment number, and none of the students who 
began school last fall were successful in obtaining a xueji. 
 Reactions seem mixed among the migrant school administrators and migrant  parents I 
talked to. Many were understandably and predictably upset, angered, and worried over the 
inconsistencies in the system. Principal Tian of the Future Bilingual Elementary School 
described the high barriers of entry as “a kind discrimination against outsiders of Beijing, like the 
kind of discrimination they  have against outsiders in the U.S. and China. How can they  treat us 
this way? These are just children.” She added, “the xueji issue is one of our biggest problems.”45 
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44 "Interview with Principal Zhang." Personal interview. 4 June 2014.
45 Interview with Principal Tian." Personal interview. 26 May 2014.
 Under the current standardized xueji system, parents can send their children back to their 
hometown to register for a xueji number and attend school in their hometown. However, many 
parents understandably  fear that  their children will join the ranks of China’s millions of “left 
behind children.” These children are left to live in rural villages with grandparents or older 
relatives while their parents migrate for work, and they suffer high academic drop-out rates and 
rates of mental illness, injury, and crime (Crothall 2009).
 Perhaps because of the unattractiveness of sending their elementary-age children back to 
workers’ hometowns, I could find no indication that more migrant parents were opting to send 
their children back home rather than have them continue without xueji and official recognition at 
unlicensed migrant schools in Beijing. Teacher Cao, a Haidian migrant teacher, blamed not only 
the lack of transparency with the xueji system, but also the migrant parents themselves for not 
trying harder and asking better questions: “The problem is how many parents know [all of the 
information?] Most don’t. Not even half know what is going on. They  never ask about the whole 
system, only what  is going on right in front of them.”46 During an encounter with two parents at 
Chaoyang Migrant School, I witnessed their inquiries about open spots for the coming fall 
semester. The principal listed the school fees and asks for their ID card (“身份证”), hukou 
booklet, living address, and telephone number, and very explicitly told the parents they should 
take into account that the school was unlicensed and that therefore, their child would not receive 
a xueji. “We know, that’s fine,” the parents replied simply, before taking down the principal’s 
contact information and leaving. Whether because they have no other options, have no 
knowledge about the education system, or lack a stake in their children’s education, parents 
continue to enroll their children in migrant schools. 
 A Question of Scarcity or of Politics
 Why has Beijing decided to use the xueji system to exclude migrants from the public 
education system? According to Linxiu Zhang, the director of Stanford University’s Rural 
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46 Interview with Teacher Cao." Personal interview. 16 May 2014.
Education Action Project (REAP) 47  center based at  Renmin University, the deciding factor is 
one of scarcity  rather than politics. She described the efforts of several other provinces and cities, 
notably Shanghai, in improving the educational services offered to migrants:
 “There is a lot  of heterogeneity  in how governments handle migrant 
education. Beijing is not the slowest nor is the worst, but the process is often very  slow. I 
guess it has a lot  to do with the size of the migrant community in Beijing. It’s a mega city 
with a lot of people outside. So far there are some places where there are a lot of public 
school that have abundant resources. The factories that manufacture steel relocated there 
from Beijing, so public schools have a lot  of vacancies and accept lots of migrant 
children. 
 In Shanghai, most of them have been accommodated in public school though 
segmented reform. Sometimes, migrant children will enter the [public] schools however, 
and the urban children retreat and go to other places. However, in Jiangsu Province, 
especially in [the city of] Suzhou, most migrant schools are still privately  run. Again, 
there is a lot of heterogeneity. 
 In [the city of] Hangzhou [in Zhejiang province], there are some public 
schools but still mostly  private schools open to migrant students. In some prefectures that 
are enrolling migrant students, there is a balance between urban and migrant and local 
resources are available. For example, in Fujian province, the government spend a lot of 
money  building schools to specifically  accommodate migrant children, as there is an 
industrial shift towards moving inland, so there are more resources available on the 
coastal areas now.”48
Professor Zhang of Renmin University highlights some of the policy reforms 49  that have 
mollified critics of migrant education and turned the spotlight away from the topic. However, as 
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47 REAP is a research institute headquartered at both Stanford University and Renmin University and is dedicated to 
implementing research that has a measurable impact. They focus on topics of rural development, child nutrition and 
education, and the rural-urban divide. 
48  The global recession of 2008-2009 hurt China’s economy, which is heavily dependent on export-driven growth. 
Factories who had their orders cancelled by overseas companies laid off millions of workers,  who returned to their 
home villages in the central and west of China. Moreover,  stronger union activity and labor activism, more effective 
labor laws, have increased the cost of labor on China’s coastal cities, causing several large corporations to build 
factories inland. For more information on this migratory and manufacturing pattern, see “The End of Cheap China 
49 The problem of migrant education has attracted more public attention and official resources since the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. First tier cities with large migrant populations have taken a number of reform measures, with Shanghai 
emerging as a leader with the scope and ambition of its initiatives. How effective and penetrating Shanghai’s 
reforms have been is questionable and in need of more research. 
Linxiu Zhang’s remarks demonstrate, that reform is often haphazard and - to use her term - 
heterogeneous. It  suggests that reforms are driven not by political opinion or will, but are pushed 
forward (and alternately held back) by the availability of resources. In provinces that have 
experienced the declines in migrant inflows, educational resources have been freed up  and there 
are more spots available in public schools for students without local hukou.  
What is absent in the discussions I had were mentions of social, economic, and political 
discrimination against migrants. Professor Zhang was told by a high level Beijing district official 
that the city “had enough resources to put every migrant child in school, but they were afraid 
[that by doing so], the city would attract even more migrants.” Such off-the-record comments 
imply reasons outside of resource scarcity  are responsible for the under-provision of education 
for migrant children in Beijing. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
 Given the consequences of the Five Certificate policy in Beijing, how might we begin to 
address the shortcomings and challenges of migrant education in Beijing? Who should address 
these issues: the Beijing government, the central government, or educators? How will migrant 
education continue to change in the midst of ongoing urbanization efforts and talk of hukou 
reform? This chapter presents policy recommendations and predictions based on the observations 
presented in previous chapters. As China urbanizes, small and mid-size cities have begun 
liberalize their hukou regulations. Consequently, the Chinese government should make a 
concerted effort to improve migrant education resources and policies in urbanizing cities. 
The Precarity of Migrant Schools
 Because of  significant variation in the Five Certificate Policy between Beijing’s districts, 
I also discovered an additional element of heterogeneity within districts between migrant schools 
and their local officials. In my journeys to the far reaches of Beijing’s suburbs, I encountered a 
wide spectrum of self-described relationships migrant school principals had with their local, 
district officials. On one end of the spectrum were the schools that had close, working 
relationships with officials who were sympathetic and supportive of the services migrant schools 
provided in the absence of public institutions. On the other end were schools that had been 
previously  demolished and relocated and remained fearful of talking to outsiders about their 
local political circumstances. 
Precarity emerged as a dominant theme in the course of my research.  Precarity  as a term 
is increasingly used to critique capitalism in a globalizing world economy and way corporations 
shift risk and instability  onto their workers. The rise of the “temp worker” and globally 
increasing numbers of migrant workers has led academics to call this group of replaceable 
workers and their uncertain, day-to-day existence “the precariat” (Standing 2011) Other 
academics have extended the scope of the term “precarity” to describe a general social zeitgeist 
63
of uncertainty  and cynicism with economic causes (Allison 2013). In general, “precarity” refers 
to a mode of existence that is predicated on the disposability  of the individual and long-term 
insecurity, even while the parties in question productively contribute to society.
I argue that migrant schools are subject to the precarity that affects China’s migrant 
workers. The district-level variation in policy implementation underscores the precarity of 
migrant education and the constant  negotiation and guessing that comes with migrant  education. 
At some schools, principals operated in a vacuum of knowledge and a constant state of precarity; 
they  had no predictive power about the prospects for the next year.  Other schools had won the 
support of local officials and were receiving direct financial support from district governments to 
continue operating. This lack of information and the political opaqueness of Beijing policy 
towards migrant  schools render the migrant experience a highly unstable and fractious one, 
dependent on the whims of district officials and annual policy changes. Like migrants, migrant 
schools are marginalized politically  and economically, despite their function in providing 
education to migrant students who fall between the cracks of the public education system. 
Moreover, despite the highly diverse circumstances of each school, migrant  schools are viewed 
homogeneously as similar to one another, illegal enterprises that offer identical services. Yet as 
my research demonstrates, migrant schools differ widely in administration, quality, and the kinds 
of social services they offer the greater migrant community.
Resource Scarcity 
 Many of the challenges I identified in migrant schools stemmed from resource scarcity: a 
scarcity of financial resources, political capital, and human resources.  Moreover, facing constant 
precarity, migrant schools have not been able to make longterm investments in improving the 
hardware and software of their schools in order to address these challenges. Excluded from the 
public education system, migrant schools suffer shaky often tight  finances, which directly 
affected the quality  and scope of the curriculum offered to migrant students. Unable to pay high 
salaries and competitive working conditions, migrant schools also have a difficult time attracting 
and retaining high quality teachers. Moreover, the teachers that do stay  must work with these 
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limited resources to become not just  teachers, but a surrogate family to their migrant students. 
Meanwhile, heterogeneous political treatment and more recently, the inconsistent 
implementation of the Five Certificate Policy exacerbates these existing challenges by  legally 
marginalizing migrant students. The Five Certificate Policy is just one of many factors that 
influence the implementation and quality of migrant education; addressing fundamental issues of 
hukou reform and financial inequality at the root of the challenges listed here will be necessary  to 
truly ameliorate the migrant problem. 
Policy Recommendations
 First, the Five Certificate Policy should be standardized and implemented uniformly 
across all Beijing districts. Moreover, there should be a unified and easily accessible information 
source for any  applicants on both the web and in the form of a smartphone application. For 
migrants who decide that they would rather apply for their children’s xueji in their home 
provinces, Beijing should also establish an office that will help with the inter-provincial 
paperwork and communication required to apply from afar. 
 To truly address the problem of scarcity within migrant schools, the Beijing school 
system should look to the Shanghai model of gradually incorporating migrant schools into the 
public education system (see the section “Efforts at Reform” in Chapter 1 for more information). 
Like Shanghai, Beijing should gradually phase into its public education system the best 
performing migrant schools and open up  new schools for migrant students to address the present 
50,000 - 70,000 migrant students who fall outside of the xueji system. By incorporating the best 
quality migrant schools into the public system, Beijing would be able to better regulate migrant 
education and provide a more stable environment for their operation. Challenges related to 
resource scarcity - safety, teacher quality and retention, financial limitations - would be slowly 
ameliorated with this gradual absorption of select migrant schools.  
 However, the problem of migrant education is due to structural inequalities which will 
take concerted reform efforts which target the roots of such inequalities. In the long term, the 
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central Chinese government should take advantage of the opportunities and flexibilities being 
presently created by the ongoing process of urbanization to better educational systems and 
opportunities among its inland and less developed cities. Unless China develops a more well-
distributed landscape of educational and employment opportunity  around the country - rather 
than being concentrated among the big, east coast cities - then migrant  issues will continue to be 
social challenges China faces in the coming decade. 
 However, I surmise that the Five Certificate Policy in particular is not, in fact, a policy 
designed to accommodate Beijing’s large migrant population but instead a policy  designed to 
actively discourage migrants from coming to or further residing in Beijing. Commonly, urban 
public schools are unwilling to take in migrant children because public education is largely 
funded by local government revenue (Zhao 2009). Thus, public schools are reluctant to take on 
migrant students because they impose extra costs, and their parents do not pay  urban taxes. 
While other cities have had static or even decreasing school enrollment numbers, Beijing has 
remained inundated with incoming migrants and their children each year. The Beijing 
government has consequently  undertaken numerous measures since the early 2000s to 
discourage migrants from moving to Beijing and to close existing migrant schools, and the Five 
Certificate Policy is an extension of such anti-migrant policies. Thus, it is unlikely  that Beijing 
will make any significant amendments to its education policy in the fear that doing so would 
attract even more migrants to the city.
 Yet migrant education will endure, in some shape or form, as China continues to urbanize 
in the next few decades. How Beijing and the rest  of the country decides to address this 
education gap will determine how China incorporates its migrant populations into the fabric of 
society and immediately affect the fate of millions of migrant children. 
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Appendix 1: Survey instruments
Interview topics
Below are issues I raised with every migrant school I visited; the remainder of our semi-
structured interview I left open to spontaneous responses and follow-up questions.
1. School history and operation (fees, operational costs, curriculum, extracurricular activities
2. Licensed status of the school
3. Demographic information about their students and community
4. Interviewees own background and experience in education 
5. Relationship with local politicians, any threats of closure or support
6. School enrollment number 
7. Effects of the Five Certificate Policy
8. Their biggest challenges their schools face
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9.
Migrant School form
Part 1: School description
1、School has__________people, with_  __ grades, with   ___  classes。
School was started in _______
2、School is _____ _meters (平方米)，with  ____  teachers。
It’s facilities can be best described as (example: former factory):
3、Each grade has    ___   classes (班). Each grade has: 
4. School fees are _______ per semester. This fee includes: 
Permits needed to attend this school: 
Permits to attend local public school (name of school):
Number of other migrant schools nearby: _________
5. School’s financial resources are from:
6、学校学生生源 (source of students)
name of community
population
occupations:
7. Mobility of students is high/medium/low: 
Part 2: School facilities
1、School facilities
Complete Satisfactory Lacking N/A Number
School buildings
Teacher dorms
Student dorms
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Playground
Multimedia 
equipment
Sports equipment
Music equipment
2、School teachers
Education 
circumstances
Masters Undergraduate Specialist HS/Middle School Other
Number
Teacher Age 20 and under 20-30 years 30-40 years 40-50 years 50 and up
Number
# years teaching 1 2-3 4-5 5+ Other
Number
Student to teacher ratio：teacher/student＝__／__。
3、Extra courses (music, art, recreational)
Yes/no Taught by who? Meetings per week
Music
Fitness
Art
4. Core courses: 
Part 3: Contact
1. Principal： _________________ Contact：_______________________
2、该学校负责与社工对接的老师是：______________，
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Contact：_______________________
3、Background of principal: 
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Appendix 2: Interview data
Organizations, researchers, and academics interviewed
Organization Description Person Interviewed
Rural Action 
Education Program 
(REAP)
REAP is a research institute between Stanford 
University and several Chinese universities, 
focused on research on child development in 
China. 
Linxiu Zhang, Director
Project BEAM 
(Bridging 
Educational and 
Mobility)
Project BEAM is a nonprofit founded to 
disperse small educational grants to migrant 
teachers in Beijing.
Danna Liu, site 
coordinator
Emily He, afterschool 
program coordinator
New Workers 
Project (新公民计
划)
New Workers is a Beijing-based 
nongovernmental organization that runs the 
Xingzhi New Citizens migrant school and 
supports a wide range of research and 
programming initiatives on migrant schools.
Wang Hui, 
communications 
coordinator 
Wei Jiayu, head 
researcher
Chuanzhixing Social 
and Economic 
Research Institute(传
知⾏行社会经济研究
所)
The research institute is the brainchild and 
singularly run operation of a company analyst 
who produces reports on left-behind children 
each year. 
Ren Xinghui, founder 
and director 
Cui Zi’en Cui Zi’en is well-known filmmaker and gay 
rights activist in Beijing. While his oeuvre is 
characterized by films about the homosexual 
community, he has also spent a significant 
amount of time on migrant issues, culminating 
in a documentary called We are the...of 
Communism about a large migrant school that 
closed in the early 2000s. He also teaches at 
the Beijing Film Academy. 
Cui Zi’en
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Organization Description Person Interviewed
Rural Women’s 
Organization (农家
⼥女)
Rural Women’s Organization (农家女) is a 
local social organization that provides after 
school programming and study spaces to local 
elementary school children, as well as support 
services to young mothersin the Bai Miao 
community in Changping District. 
Professor Zhang, 
Renmin University, 
Beijing
Professor Zhang studies elementary education 
and issues of social identity formation and 
assimilation
Schools visited
School Description Person Interviewed
Tongxin Elementary 
School (同心小学), 
Tongxin Elementary School (同心小学）is an 
elementary school started and managed by the 
migrant workers’ organization, New Workers 
Art Troupe (新工人艺术团). New Workers 
Art Troupe also runs a worker advocacy 
branch, a community arts center, several 
consignment shops, and a workers’ history 
museum. The school is located outside the 
Fifth Ring, in Chaoyang District.
Xu Duo, musician, 
teacher, founder of 
Tongxin Elementary 
School
Dandelion Middle 
School (蒲公英中
学) 
Dandelion Middle School (蒲公英中学) was 
founded in 2005 by Zheng Hong, a former 
Beijing professor. It is still managed by 
Principal Hong. Approximately 500 7-9 
graders attend Dandelion, located on the 
southern outskirts of Beijing in Daxin district, 
a district known for its garment factories. 
Wang Yiyan, Graduate 
and alumni affairs 
coordinator
Han Yu Henry, math 
teacher
M i c h e l l e Z h a n g , 
English teacher 
English teacher
Liu Kun, external 
relations
Bochen Han, volunteer
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Richard Cao, volunteer
BN Vocational 
School in Beijing 
BN Vocational School (百年职校) is a 
vocational school funded by the China Youth 
Foundation and the Ford Foundation. It has 
nine branches all over China, including one in 
Beijing that provides for approximately 90 
students per year. Education is focused on 
technical, repair, and service skills. 
Diao Wen, Principal
May Zhang, English 
teacher
Small Swan (小天鹅
小学) Elementary 
School
Small Swan (小天鹅小学) Elementary School 
was started in 2010 in Changping District and 
has grown to 600 students. Its principal, a 
former volunteer teacher at a nearby migrant 
school, has a background in aerospace but was 
tapped by the school’s principal after the 
school was closed by local authorities. 
Principal, founder
Blue Skies (蓝天凤
元）Elementary 
School
Blue Skies (蓝天凤元）Elementary School 
has approximately 1,200 students in grades 
1-6. Its principal, a former Hebei public 
school principal and teacher at Nan Yuan 
public middle school for decades before 
retiring and starting Blue Skies in 2005 in 
Fengtai District. Blue Skies is one of three 
migrant schools in Fengtai and is the only one 
that receives significant local government 
support, making it one of the rare “gongli 
ming 
Principal, founder
Future Bilingual 
School （未来双语
学校）
Begun by a former school principal from 
Mongolia in 2004, the school is located in the 
Chaoyang district. The school’s nearby 
community is overwhelmingly all migrants.
Principal
Teacher
Teacher
Migrant school in 
Chaoyang district
Founded in 2005, this school is located in 
northernmost Chaoyang district in Beijing. 
The principal requested that his identity and 
that of the school’s remain undisclosed in any 
published materials. 
Principal
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Bai Miao (白庙实验
学校)Experimental 
Elementary School
Located in Changping district, this school is 
one of the few migrant schools which offers 
some middle school education for its students. 
Principal Zhang
Beijing East Wind 
Love and Hope 
Elementary School 
(北京⻛风华爱心希望
小学)
Begun in Haidian by a migrant herself 17 
years ago, this school is was located in the 
poorest migrant community by far. The 
principal’s personal dedication to the school 
and the amount of after school programming 
was notable relative to other migrant schools.  
Teacher Cao
Principal
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Appendix 3: Analysis of Certificate Requirements 
Proving Residency
 To receive the first “certificate,” the Proof of Residency, a migrant worker would have to 
provide at least the following documents: 50 
1. If they  own property, their housing ownership certificates or purchase contract and a copy of 
the original housing construction sector registered.
2. If they rent (most likely), the migrant must present proof of rental housing, a “standardized 
and effective” (规范有效的房屋有租赁合同) housing lease contract.
3. In addition as well as the original owner real estate license, the migrant must also provide the 
property  owner’s original ID card (身份证) and a copy  of the property owner’s ID card. The 
rental property must  be up to safety code to protect the safety of children and adolescents, and 
the migrant must be ready to provide the “safety responsibility booklet” if asked.
4. Those living in public housing rental units should provide proof of housing authority approval. 
Renting an office space or a basement does not count as public housing.
Already, the migrant  worker must provide at least four items of paperwork, including original 
copies and scanned copies of each. Moreover, the ID card (身份证), which is akin to an 
American Social Security  card, is an extremely valuable and important all-purpose form of 
identification. It would be nearly impossible for a migrant worker to bring his/her landlord’s 
original ID card to the Public Security Bureau. Moreover, almost all migrants rent due to 
Beijing’s infamously  high property prices (the 11th highest in the world) (Frank 2014). The 
poorest migrants tend to rent on the outskirts of the city in one-story brick or metal apartments 
for which obtaining the owner’s real estate license and safety codes is impossible because many 
of the dwellings have been built illegally. 
81
50 For the original Mandarin for all districts’ five certificate requirements, please see the Appendix
 On top of these items, in Dongcheng district, migrant parents must  also provide the 
original copy and a printed copy of their mobile population registration certificate and a 
residence certificate issued by community  committees (流动人口登记证明 and 社区居委会开
具的居住证明). Given the fact that these two certificates are only required in Dongcheng 
district, they are most likely specific to Dongcheng district and have their own particular process 
for application. 
 Daxing District, where many migrants live, has modeled their district-wide policies after 
a particular town, Yizhuang, in the district. In Yizhuang Town (and now all of Daxin), migrant 
workers must be able to prove that they have lived in Daxin for at least three years (measured as 
beginning April 2011 at the time of the policy declaration) before applying for any of the five 
certificates. Thus, any migrant worker who moved to Beijing after April 2011 or cannot provide 
a paperwork trail of their official residence in Daxin will not be able to receive any of the five 
certificates in Daxin district. 
Proof of Family Hukou
The Beijing city requirements for obtaining the proof of Family hukou (全家户口簿) are below.
1. The ages of children and adolescents in the hukou booklet and birth certificate booklet on age 
should be consistent. 
2. If the child is over age and not in school, they should go to their local subdistrict  office to 
prove their area of domicile or township people's government or county government 
department of education, and explain the reasons for failure to admission to a school. 
3. When at  the office, provide the "non-city residence-age children Fact Sheet,” while providing 
relevant evidence, such as hospital records or kindergarten proof. 
4. Children should provide proof of domicile issued by the health department or social 
compensation fee proof.
 Like the preceding two certificates, the certificate of family  hukou also exhibits variation 
between Beijing’s various districts. While the variations are not as significant as for Proof of 
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Employment or Residence, they nonetheless present additional challenges for migrants 
attempting to secure a xueji for their child(ren). 
 Dongcheng and Daxin districts require that children for whom parents are applying for a 
xueji must be within a certain age, defined as those born between September 1, 2007 and August 
31, 2008 at the time of the policy announcement, which would make them six years old. 
Unfortunately, migrant children and their parents enter and leave Beijing at various ages. 
Migrant children often enter school at  older ages and migrant schools struggle with how to deal 
with classrooms that are composed of students with different ages and education backgrounds. 
Consequently, migrant children who do not fall within this narrow age band presumably would 
not qualify for the Family hukou certificate. The rest of Beijing’s districts for which “five 
certificate” information could be obtained required that children applying for xueji had to be of 
age “in line with the admission requirements of that year,” but do not explain how that age is 
defined. This is consistent with parents I talked to, who described inconsistent and opaque 
guidelines for applying for xueji even in their home provinces. and could not receive the 
appropriate grade-level xueji for their children.51 
 For the Family hukou, parents do not need to present their marriage certificates, with the 
exception of, again, Dongcheng district, where migrant parents must  provide their marriage 
certificate and official documentation to prove any cases of divorce for single-parent applicants. 
 While the Beijing city-wide guidelines list the option to use documentation that they have 
paid a “social compensation fee” in lieu of an official birth certificate, the former is not clearly 
defined. The social compensation fee (“缴纳社会抚养费证明”) is ostensibly  the monthly social 
insurance payments (“社保”) required in many districts to secure the Proof of Employment 
certificate. Yet the Chinese characters for each social program are different and it is unclear 
whether they refer to the same insurance program. In Dongcheng, Xicheng, Chaoyang, Fengtai, 
Shijingshan, Tongzhou, Changping, and Daxin districts, documentation that  parents have paid 
83
51 "Interview with Teacher Li." Personal interview. 4 June 2014.
into this “social compensation fee” is required to secure this certificate. As discussed in Chapter 
1 and described in the process of applying for Proof of Employment, migrant parents often do 
not know they need to be paying into such social insurance schemes and render themselves 
ineligible to apply for later certificates. 
 Oddly, Fengtai district is the only district that requires a “proof of vaccination” for 
migrant children, but Fengtai district does not specify which vaccinations must be secured nor 
the dates for which the vaccinations must be valid. 
Temporary living permit in Beijing
 For the most  part, the process for securing a temporary  living permit in Beijing is the 
most standard and straightforward: 
1. Both parents must hold temporary residence issued by the local police station and the 
temporary residence permit.
2. The temporary residence permit in Beijing and the actual residence address and proof of 
residence must be consistent. 
3. A temporary residence permit information must be printed; any altered renders it invalid.
 Xicheng is the only  district that has added an amendment to these guidelines, which is 
that migrant parents must have lived at  the same address in Beijing for at least  half a year and 
must have entered Beijing before March 1, 2014. It is unclear what parents with young children 
who entered Beijing after this date should do to enroll their children in the coming fall semester. 
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